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This thesis attempts to provide a response to two critiques directed towards 
Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrines of Ideas and Intelligible 
Characters, while offering a new reading of their role and relevance. On the 
one hand, I intend to address concerns that regard Ideas as “third ontological 
categories”. On the other, I provide a response to the “problem of 
individuation of Intelligible Characters”. This is done by means of analysing 
the parallelism of both doctrines and presenting their relevance to 
Schopenhauer’s epistemology. This thesis is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter One is intended to serve as an introduction to Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy and nomenclature. In Chapter Two, I discuss the problem of 
Ideas as “third categories”, while presenting the means that lead us to 
address this problem. Chapter Three is dedicated to presenting the problem 
of individuation of Intelligible Characters. In this chapter I show that there 
is a close parallelism between this doctrine and that of Ideas, rendering the 
role of Intelligible Characters to be explanatory devices. In Chapter Four, I 
present a reading of Ideas and Intelligible Characters intended to address the 
incompleteness of a causal explanation of nature. They are presented as the 
philosophical counterpart of an understanding of the world through efficient 










This thesis presents a new reading on the relationship and integration of the 
doctrines of Ideas and Intelligible Characters in Schopenhauer. This work 
will contribute to the understanding and interpretation of the unity of 
Schopenhauer’s system. It will be beneficial for academic purposes as it 
presents a reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s thoughts on the philosophical 
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For anyone familiar with Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy, it is 
not always easy to reconcile some apparently incompatible aspects of his 
system, particularly in the light of his Kantian background. This is the case 
for Schopenhauer’s adoption of the originally Platonic doctrine of Ideas and 
of the Kantian doctrine of Intelligible Characters. The aim of this thesis is to 
present a double solution. First, I will address some criticisms of 
Schopenhauer’s use of Ideas based on the apparent confusion that these 
correspond to a “third ontological category”, unconvincing considering his 
purported original project. Second, I will provide an answer to the difficulty, 
posed originally by Christopher Janaway, of the possibility of the spatio-
temporal individuation of Intelligible Characters in the light of an apparent 
contradiction entered into by Schopenhauer. This is to be done by 
presenting a reading of the coherence and necessity of both doctrines as a 
philosophical answer to the explanatory incompleteness of causality in two 
of its forms. Overall, through the exposition of these problems, my intention 
is to provide an answer to the following question: Do Ideas and Intelligible 
Characters constitute a “third ontological category” in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy? I argue that the critiques directed towards these doctrines arise 
from a misconception about the relevance they have for reaching a complete 
understanding of nature as a whole. As a result, one could expect that this 
reading coheres with Schopenhauer’s, though not always consistent, use of 
the terminology related to these doctrines, thus according a better 
understanding of the unity and consistency of his entire system. Moreover, 
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this reading portrays the doctrine of Intelligible Characters as being more 
fundamental to Schopenhauer’s epistemology than has thus far been 
regarded.  
There are three claims I would like to defend. The first one is that 
Ideas, in spite of the confusing manner in which Schopenhauer presents 
them, are not to be treated as a “third ontological category”. The reasons for 
this lie in Schopenhauer’s repeated assertions of the unity of the world and 
his idea that Will1 and representation are not two separate ontological 
categories. Rather, I argue that the Will-representation distinction is 
epistemological. As a consequence, the status of Ideas as objects of 
knowledge locates them at a representational level and they must be treated 
as such. The second claim I defend is that it is necessary for Schopenhauer 
to make use of the doctrine of Intelligible Characters, which leads us to a 
solution of the difficulty of its individuation. This originates in the 
explanatory incompleteness of human action, which parallels 
Schopenhauer’s necessity to use the doctrine of Ideas, or at least a version 
of it. The reason for this is that, in a similar way that Ideas are intended to 
somehow “complete” the etiological explanation of nature, Characters 
constitute the last explanatory factor that completes our understanding of 
human action. Overall, this interpretation makes the doctrine of Characters a 
necessary feature, without which Schopenhauer’s account of human action 
and agency are, to Schopenhauer’s regret, philosophically incomplete. The 
                                                 
1
  Throughout this thesis, I make use of “Will” (capitalized) to refer to 
Schopenhauer’s special use of the term. Of course, this special use does not express 
willingness as it ordinarily would. More about that will be explained in this thesis.  
Although Schopenhauer himself does not use the capital letter to distinguish this particular 




difficulty of the individuation of Intelligible Characters will be addressed by 
presenting its parallel with the doctrine of Ideas. As a consequence of the 
two previous points, I sustain a subsidiary claim about Ideas and Intelligible 
Characters: Ideas are meant to serve as an epistemological counterpart of a 
view of the world through efficient causes, while Intelligible Characters fill 
the incompleteness of an understanding of the world through final causes. 
This reading is reached through the analysis of Schopenhauer’s own 
assertions on the matter and the explicit parallelism he draws between the 
two doctrines. I argue, that without this distinction regarding their purposes, 
the reasons for the use of both doctrines instead of a single one would 
remain unclear.  
 This thesis, is thus intended as an response to critiques that see the 
adoption of these doctrines as a contradiction on Schopenhauer’s part. 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy has been consistent throughout all his writings, 
however, these particular philosophical views are preeminent in some of his 
works more than others. For this reason, I make use of more than one source 
when discussing a particular aspect of his philosophy. Assuming and 
embracing such consistency, I expect that the unity and coherence of it will 
be clearer.  
As often happens, it can be difficult to argue for a complete 
consistency of such a large philosophical system. As much as one would 
like to advocate for it, consistency in some areas is often offset by 
inconsistency in others. Due to the flexible character of Schopenhauer’s 
terminology, I acknowledge the possibility of other readings, which may 
even better explain other aspects of his philosophy. Part of the motivation 
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for writing this thesis is the consideration that the doctrines of Ideas and 
Characters in Schopenhauer’s writings are sustained by philosophically 
necessary foundations. Consequently, although I intend to make some 
aspects of the whole system more understandable and consistent, an 
absolute coherence of Schopenhauer’s remarks will hardly be reached, 
particularly in the light of his scattered use of nomenclature. Particularly, I 
advocate for the consistency between the two doctrines of Ideas and 
Characters, which may have as a consequence the further difficulty of 
finding a coherent account of some of Schopenhauer’s remarks. In this 
thesis I advocate for the unity of his system, even though in such unity 
contradictions might be found. As a consequence, I will not focus my 
attention on more isolated instances of inconsistency in his use of 
nomenclature. Rather, this is an attempt to put at ease some worrying 
problems that arise from Schopenhauer’s exposition of both doctrines. 
 This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter One gives a general 
introduction to Schopenhauer’s thought, familiarising the reader with some 
of his basic nomenclature and definitions. Chapter Two initiates the 
discussion by presenting the critiques on Ideas as “third categories” and 
presents a solution through a reading that highlights their explanatory role in 
nature. The “third category critique” arises from a neglect of the 
epistemological role assigned to Ideas in our understanding of nature as a 
whole and Schopenhauer’s division of his purported ontology. Chapter 
Three addresses the problem of individuation of Intelligible Characters as a 
consequence of the misconception about the role and necessity of the 
doctrine of Ideas. In this chapter, I also present the parallelism drawn by 
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Schopenhauer between the two doctrines and use it as a basis for an answer 
to the discussion about individuation. In the final chapter I give the solution 
to the problem of individuation, thus arguing that plurality of Intelligible 
Characters and Ideas results from their dependence on a knowing subject. I 
also present a reading of the doctrine of Ideas and Intelligible Characters as 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical answer to the incompleteness of causality. In 
addition, I present Edward Kleist’s solution to the problem of individuation 
and argue for its inconsistency on the basis of his disregard for 
Schopenhauer’s distinction between efficient and final causes as explanatory 
for inorganic and organic nature respectively.  
Since I do not add a conclusion for every chapter, I conclude this 
exposition with an assessment of the content presented in this these and 
















1.1 Schopenhauer’s Principle of Sufficient Reason 
 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is commonly characterised as a unitary 
thought. Whoever reads his entire works will realise that, although they 
differ in their approach, each piece of his writings is part of an organic 
system that is meant to be read in its entirety. Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
borrowing David Cartwright’s (2010) words, “does not proceed like the 
progress of history, in a straight line”, but is meant to be understood as a 
unity, “so that repeated study of his work is required to understand the 
multiple connections between all the parts of his thought” (p. 294). 
The most basic and most immediate conception of the world 
presented by Schopenhauer in the opening lines of his main work, The 
World as Will and Representation, is that “the world is my representation” 
(WW I p. 3), which can be understood as both  the starting point and the 
ending point of his philosophy. Schopenhauer follows the Kantian 
distinction between the world as in-itself and as phenomenal, not without 
adapting and using part of this nomenclature to express his own thoughts. 
This first section focuses on the latter notion of this distinction, the world of 
phenomena. Following a Kantian agenda, Schopenhauer held that time, 
space, and causality (as a result of their union), do not belong to things as 
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they are in themselves, but to the knowing subject as forms found a priori in 
our understanding, giving origin to the world as representation. In 
Schopenhauer’s words: “all causality, hence all matter, and consequently 
the whole of reality, is only for the understanding, through the 
understanding, in the understanding” (WW I p. 11). All of our 
representations, Schopenhauer says, “are objects for the subject, and all 
objects for the subject are our representations” (FR p. 30). All of these 
representations stand in relation to one another by a connection, viz. the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR from now on). Schopenhauer held that 
the PSR is the expression in the representation of the unity of all the forms 
of the object of which we are “a priori conscious” (space, time and 
causality), and thus “in it is expressed the whole of our a priori certain 
knowledge” (WW I p. 6). Schopenhauer defines this principle as follows: 
“Nothing is without a ground or reason why it is” (FR p. 10). The origins of 
this principle have their roots in that objects of representation “stand to one 
another in a connection that is governed by laws and of a form determinable 
a priori, by means of which connexion nothing existing of itself and 
independently, likewise nothing existing in isolation and apart, can be an 
object for us” (FR p. 30). Schopenhauer, in the Fourfold Root, describes that 
these relations among objects are of four classes, that in turn are governed 
by four forms of the PSR. These are the principle of sufficient reason of 
becoming, knowing, being, and willing. Although I will briefly present all of 
them, the first and the last forms are the ones that will occupy most of our 
attention throughout this thesis.  
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The reach of the PSR of becoming concerns the connectedness of 
“all objects that present themselves in the totality of representations that 
constitute the complex of empirical reality” (FR p. 38). To this class of 
object I will refer throughout this thesis as objects of perceptual experience 
(because they correspond to the objects of empirical reality), and in 
Schopenhauer’s terminology are regarded as those of intuitive 
representation. These types of objects are characterised by their status as 
representation derived from the action of the understanding through its 
forms over the sensory data. Schopenhauer describes this form of the 
principle thus: “If a new state of one or more real objects appears, then there 
must be another, previous state from which the new one follows according 
to a rule, i.e. as often as the first exists, every time” (FR p. 38). In short, the 
first form of the PSR rules over objects of perceptual experience and 
determines their connectedness to one another. As a result, no object is to be 
understood individually for it is always the cause and effect of another. It 
both determines and is determined. Objects of perceptual experience are, for 
Schopenhauer, intuitive, complete, and empirical representations (FR p. 33). 
They are intuitive, as opposed to abstract objects, like thoughts or concepts. 
They also are complete insofar as they, in a rather Kantian vein, contain not 
only formal but also material properties. Finally, they are empirical for they 
“have their origin in excitation of sensation in our sensitive body” (FR p. 
33) which, as mentioned earlier, makes them belong to the complex of 
empirical reality. 
 I would like now to centre our focus on the second of these 
characteristics. The formal properties of this kind of object are constituted 
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by their belonging in time and space, which makes them representations of 
inner and outer sense respectively. Schopenhauer considers this 
characteristic to be necessary for the existence of real objects as such. As 
Schopenhauer remarks, “empirical representations belonging to the law-
governed complex of reality appear in both forms simultaneously, and the 
intimate unity of both is even the condition of reality” (FR p. 34, emphasis 
in original). Space allows for simultaneity, persistence and duration, 
whereas time allows for the possibility of change through succession. The 
important point lies in the conjunction of these two forms, which is made 
through understanding which, for Schopenhauer, is a brain function. This 
feature, Schopenhauer says, “combines those heterogeneous forms of 
sensibility so that from their mutual interpenetration (although just for the 
understanding itself) empirical reality arises as a totality of representations” 
(FR p. 34) at the time that it renders the subjective sensation (raw data) into 
object intuition when it applies “its single and only form, the law of 
causality” (FR p. 53). 
The second class of objects determined by the second form of this 
principle are objects of abstract representation, as opposed to those of 
intuitive representations. For Schopenhauer, the main difference between 
these classes of objects lies in the faculties involved in their origins. While 
objects of intuitive representation are derived from the a priori forms of the 
understanding, abstract representations depend on the exclusively human 
faculty of reason, giving origin to concepts. These are derived as the 
“faculty of abstraction reduces complete and hence, intuitive representations 
[…] to their constituents in order to be able to think about these separately, 
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each in itself, as different properties or relations of things” (FR p. 94). Thus, 
this form of the principle governs the relation between concepts, as it also 
governs the principles of logical truth. 
The third form of objects the principle governs are space and time as 
pure intuitions, thus not perceived as operating on the matter. Time and 
space as pure forms give origin to inner and outer sense for the subject. The 
rules that govern these pure forms give origin to arithmetic and geometry, 
the pure intuition of time and the pure intuition of space, respectively. 
The last form of the principle has its origin in the identity between 
what Schopenhauer calls the subject of knowledge (or knowing subject) and 
the subject of willing. This third and final form has the latter as its object. 
Schopenhauer presents a progression in the subject’s knowledge about 
nature beginning with objects of perceptual experience. Every subject, 
including those of other animal species, possesses the capacity of perceiving 
the external world and, through the understanding, are able to represent 
causality. Nevertheless, in addition to outer experience, the subject of 
knowledge has its necessary correlate as an object in inner experience: the 
subject of willing. Since any cognition is necessarily constituted by 
something that cognises and something that is cognised, Schopenhauer 
asserts that the knowing subject is never able to cognise itself, i.e. to 
become the representation. because “as the necessary correlate of all 
representations, it is their condition” (FR, p. 133). In other words, in a way 
that could make us remember one of Wittgenstein’s (1961) passages, the 
subject of knowledge can never become part of the world of representation 
(p. 69). Nevertheless, through inner experience, the knowing subject 
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cognises the subject of willing. Therefore, Schopenhauer remarks, the 
knowing subject qua knowing subject can never be the object of knowledge. 
If this is so, Schopenhauer argues, in order to know the subject of cognition 
as an object, the subject of cognition itself must cease knowing and become 
just an object, which is by definition contradictory. What we do know about 
ourselves though is not the subject qua subject of knowledge but the subject 
qua subject of willing. This, Schopenhauer remarks, “is an object to the 
cognizing subject and indeed is given only to the inner sense; thus, it 
appears only in time, not in space […]” (FR, p. 133). The subject of willing 
is presented by Schopenhauer as the object of introspection. The subject of 
cognition, knowing all of the representation that in one way or another is 
subject to the PSR, is the necessary unknowable counterpart of the objects 
of knowledge. It is, in other words, one of the necessary sides of the subject-
object relation. While regarding ourselves as subjects that will, we also 
recognise the influence of motives in our actions both from the outside (like 
all other causes dependent on the PSR) and the inside. Therefore, the fourth 
form of the PSR appears as “causality seen from within” (FR p. 137), as the 
principle of sufficient reason of acting, also called the law of motivation.  
The relevance I give to the first and the last forms of the PSR in this 
thesis, agrees with F. C. White’s (1999) thesis about the importance of the 
Fourfold Root as the foundation for Schopenhauer’s system. White (1999) 
briefly stated that the importance of this work “lies in its attempt to establish 
that the everyday world is representational, to establish that the principles of 
reasoning governing that world license no inference to a reality beyond it, 
and to refute the many claims of those who hold otherwise” (p. 64). I hope 
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the reader does not take this as a grounds for what I present, but rather as 
one of the conclusions of this thesis. Schopenhauer, in portraying the root of 
the PSR previous to any of its particular forms, hints at, what in his later 
works will translate into, his view about the sciences’ incapacity of 
portraying a complete image of the world. My intention is to show, among 
other things, how this is so. 
1.2 Ideas and Aesthetic Experience 
 
In this introduction, I have mentioned that in inner experience a 
subject gets to know herself as a subject of willing. This portion of reality 
which the subject cognises in himself the Will is what constitutes for 
Schopenhauer the other half of the world; it is the closest knowledge we can 
get of the world as it is in itself. Schopenhauer held that the Will manifests 
itself in many different ways. One of these is through ‘Ideas’.2 In § 25 of the 
first volume of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer gives 
us a short and quite puzzling definition of Ideas.3 He says: “by Idea, I 
understand every definite and fixed grade of the will’s objectification, in so 
far as it is thing-in-itself and is therefore foreign to plurality. These grades 
are certainly related to individual things as their eternal forms, or as their 
                                                 
2
 From now on, I make the distinction between ‘Ideas’ and ‘Platonic Ideas’, the first 
making reference to Schopenhauer’s use of the term and to a general account of the 
doctrine adopted by Schopenhauer. The latter (although more scarcely) will be used when 
referring to Plato’s own account. As I have mentioned, Schopenhauer’s use of the 
nomenclature is not always coherent throughout his writings. We can suspect, as I will 
show below, that the similarity between his and Plato’s use of the doctrine might not be as 
sound as Schopenhauer himself may have thought. In subsequent quotes I will not assume 
that such distinction is made by the corresponding author.  
3
  From now on, whenever I make reference to a particular section of The World as Will 
and Representation, it must be understood that I am making reference to the first volume. If 
this is not the case, it will be explicitly stated.  
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prototypes” (WW I p. 130). Although there are many interpretations about 
how Ideas fit in Schopenhauer’s system, and this is something I discuss in 
the next chapter, these can be broadly understood as the unalterable eternal 
forms which determine the essence of a species. For each individual 
instance of a tree, a cat, or gold, there is a corresponding Idea that relates to 
it.  
 Ideas play an essential role in Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetics. 
They are the object of aesthetic contemplation. Schopenhauer’s account of 
aesthetics stands for the possibility of a kind of experience free from the 
spatio-temporal relations between objects in representation. The main 
problem of aesthetics, Schopenhauer says, is “how satisfaction with and in 
an object are possible without any reference thereof to our willing” (PP II p. 
415). In a different way from that in which we experience objects in an 
intuitive perceptual representation such as chairs, tables, cats and mats, 
aesthetic experience allows for a “disinterested” experience of objects. This 
consists of experiencing objects outside their causal relation to other 
objects, determined by the PSR, and even to the experiencing subject 
himself. Aesthetic experience, thus, gives us access to eternal forms free 
from spatio-temporal and causal constraints that stand as the unchanging 
forms of the objects of intuitive perceptual representation, i.e. it gives us 
access to Ideas. To regard an object independently of its causal relations 
means that the subject suspends, during the aesthetic experience, her 
volitional attitudes towards the regarded object. The object in question does 
not appear anymore to the subject in its quality of being an object within the 
PSR. It is “detached” from the subject of willing and it becomes an object of 
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knowledge for the pure subject of knowledge. The causal relations of objects 
become secondary; their essence is what matters now. To exemplify this, I 
borrow Luis Moreno’s (2010) example on aesthetic experience: 
In a garden, a man feels attracted to the unusual beauty of a rose. He gets 
close to it and touches it gently without breaking its stem. Such is the 
absorption that the man does not see any more a flower in the garden, not 
even the most beautiful. The image fills his entire attention, it fills his 
pupils and consciousness: the simply curious man becomes a pure admirer, 
someone whose sole activity is to contemplate. He becomes what 
Schopenhauer would call “reines Subjekt des Erkennens”, a pure subject of 
knowledge. What he sees now is the Platonic Idea of the rose, which 
gathers the perfection of every rose in the garden, and in all the gardens in 
the world […] (p. XI, translation mine)4 
 Schopenhauer’s use of Ideas does not lack controversy. On the 
contrary, it represents one of the most discussed aspects of his philosophy. 
One of the main features of his doctrine that is put into question is the 
coherence and necessity of introducing Ideas. This point is to be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
1.3 Empirical and Intelligible Characters 
 
One of the most detailed explanations of the doctrine of Intelligible 
Characters is presented in Schopenhauer’s essay On the basis of Morals. In 
§10 of that work, Schopenhauer discusses the possibility of the coexistence 
between necessity and freedom in human action by presenting the Kantian 
                                                 
4 In this passage the distinction between Platonic Idea and Idea is not made. I ask the reader 
to be careful in understanding this example to the letter, for it may presuppose an overall 
thesis not shared here, viz. that Platonic Idea (in the strict Platonic sense) and Idea can be 
used interchangeably.  
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doctrine of Intelligible Characters.5 Overall, the notion of Intelligible 
Characters6 is adopted by Schopenhauer in his attempt, following the 
Kantian doctrine, to determine for the possibility of freedom of action while 
maintaining a rather deterministic view of the world as representation. The 
challenge that this doctrine intends to address lies in the compatibility of the 
necessity that takes place in representation (through the determinations of 
the PSR) and the apparent fact that “our actions are accompanied by a 
consciousness of self-determination and originality by virtue of which we 
recognise them as our work and everyone feels unmistakably certain that he 
is the actual doer of his deeds and morally responsible for them” (BM p. 
184). In short, the difficulty lies in reconciling a deterministic view of the 
world as representation in which our actions unfold and the view that, from 
an intuition derived from common sense, we are the free doers of our deeds. 
Most of the discussion on the doctrine of Intelligible Characters is 
derived from Schopenhauer’s attempts to describe the possibility for human 
agency and its freedom.7 As it happens with the doctrine of Ideas, the notion 
of Intelligible Characters does not lack controversy. He describes characters 
thus:  
With his unchangeable, innate character, all the manifestations of which 
are strictly determined by the law of causality, here called motivation as 
mediated through intellect, the individual is the only appearance. Lying at 
                                                 
5
 For an account of Kant’s doctrine see Allison (1990) and Kant (1996, 1997).  
6
  Throughout this thesis I refer to these as either Intelligible Characters or simply 
Characters, both being indicated with capital letters. As I hope will become clearer later in 
this thesis, this intends to agree with Schopenhauer’s own use of the nomenclature and 
render more understandable his remarks on the topic. In addition, I make use of the term 
‘character’ when ambiguity is to be found in Schopenhauer’s work.  
7 An interesting parallelism with Sartre’s fundamental project is given in Engels (2014). 
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the base of this appearance, to be found outside space and time, free from 
all successions and plurality of acts, the thing in itself is one and 
unchangeable. Equally present in all the individual deeds, stamped in all of 
them like the signet in a thousand seals, presenting itself in time and a 
succession of acts, his nature in itself is the intelligible character which 
determines the empirical character of this appearance, which, in turn, in 
all its manifestations, called forth by motives, must show the constancy of 
a natural law, for which reason all its acts follow with strict necessity. (BM 
pp. 184-185) 
Intelligible Characters are presented as the solution to the difficulty of 
freedom in human deeds. This is shown as the “nature in itself” of all 
individual deeds. While independent of the PSR, the Intelligible Character 
stands as the place that allows for freedom. In addition to this, 
Schopenhauer describes the Kantian doctrine of characters and the essence 
of freedom in the following words: 
‘doing follows essence;’ [operari sequitur esse] i.e., everything in the world 
does according to what it is, according to its nature, in which all the 
manifestations are, therefore, already potentially [potentia] contained, but 
actually [actu] occur when external causes call them forth; whereby, then, this 
very nature appears. This is the empirical character; in contrast, its inner, 
ultimate ground, not accessible to experience, is the intelligible character, i.e., 
the essence in itself of the thing. In this the human being is no exception from 
the rest of nature: he, too, has his fixed nature, his unchangeable character, 
which is completely individual and differs with each person. (BM p. 185) 
If there is to be any self-determination in the unfolding of human 
agency, this ought to be located, Schopenhauer says, outside the scope 
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determined by the rules of the PSR. This is why all action, governed by this 
principle, ought to occur with absolute necessity, in contrast to the freedom 
of what is not determined by it. In short, there is an absolute necessity of the 
operari [actions], and an absolute freedom of the esse [the essence, or 
being] which is not governed by this principle. In order to meet this 
challenge, the Intelligible Character is presented as the most fitting 
candidate. In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer writes, 
“our character is to be regarded as the temporal unfolding of an extra-
temporal, and so indivisible and unalterable, an act of will, or of an 
intelligible character” (WW I p. 301). Due to its independence from a 
temporal determination and therefore from the PSR, the intelligible 
character is presented as the, borrowing the expression from Christopher 
Janaway (2012), “locus of responsibility” (p. 454) in the light of the strict 
necessity that follows the world as representation. All human actions that 
unfold in representation follow the form whose ultimate ground is the 
Intelligible Character. Serving as a model they determine the individual 
actions that are called forth by motives, following them with necessity. But 
it is this very feature, the independence from time, that gives us a solution to 











2.1 Ideas as “Third Categories” 
 
Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine of Ideas has raised 
discussion among commentators about how well this doctrine fits into his 
system. Although the role he assigns to Ideas, in both the understanding of 
nature and aesthetic experience, appears to be straightforward, it has 
generated debate concerning its necessity.8 Mainly, worries about Ideas 
emerge from concerns about the relationship they maintain with the two 
purported exhaustive categories of the ‘in itself’ and ‘perceptual 
phenomena’. I refer to Janaway’s concerns about the doctrine along with 
other commentators’ worries that seem to follow the same line.9 In brief, 
they see Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine of Ideas as an 
unconvincing move that does not fit his general system and that does not 
cohere with his original purpose of following the Kantian exhaustive 
distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal world. In this respect, 
Ideas are rendered as being practically disposable and unfitting for 
Schopenhauer’s system for they represent more problems than solutions. 
This view, I argue, originates in the confusion that results from regarding 
                                                 
8
  I call this interpretation “standard” because the role of the doctrine of Ideas in relation to 
individual objects is commonplace among the commentators of his literature, while the 
issue about its necessity and ontological status is more open to debate. See Atwell (1995), 
Came (2011) Heide (1966), Janaway (1994), Neeley (2011), Vandenabeele (2008, 2011) 
and White (2011). 
9
 See Hamlyn (1980), Magee (1983) and Heide (1966) 
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the world of the ‘in-itself’ and perceptual representation as two irreducible 
and exhaustive ontological categories. It identifies what Schopenhauer calls 
“representation” with what can be understood as intuitive perceptual 
representation. Presenting Janaway’s remarks is important for detecting a 
general worry about Ideas that extends to his criticisms of Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine of Intelligible Characters. This is the reason why, as an 
anticipation, I do not regard Janaway’s concerns over Ideas as isolated from 
the subsequent comments on the doctrine of Intelligible Characters. I extract 
Janaway’s view from such comments on more than one occasion. 
Hopefully, the whole extent of his critiques will be clear for the reader upon 
the exposition of both critiques. 
Janaway presents his concerns about Ideas while discussing aesthetic 
experience and attitude. The difficulties presented by the doctrine of Ideas, 
Janaway (1989) says, arise mainly from the difficulty already present in 
understanding aesthetic experience in contrast with perceptual experience 
(p. 276). While discussing Schopenhauer’s account of the aesthetic 
experience, Janaway argues that the position Ideas have in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy is unclear. His view on the coherence of Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine is permeated by the inconsistencies he sees in the notion of 
experiencing these eternal forms. His concerns arise mainly from the 
difficulties presented in Schopenhauer’s account of a will-less 
contemplation of Ideas, reached by perceptual contemplation (Janaway, 
1989, p. 277).  Consequently, Janaway finds it difficult to make real sense 
of the type of objects that are Ideas. Since aesthetic experience consists of 
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the subject getting access to Ideas, we are allowed to question their 
metaphysical status. Janaway says: 
The Ideas have an uneasy position within Schopenhauer’s metaphysics 
[…] Unlike Plato’s Forms they are explicitly not the objects of pure 
thought or reasoning, but of perceptual contemplation […] They are not 
the thing in itself, but they are the ‘most adequate objectification’ of the 
thing in itself in the world of phenomena […] In Kantian terms, the Ideas 
are to repose somewhere between appearance and thing in itself, and it is 
deeply uncertain whether there is any such location for them to occupy. 
(Janaway, 1989, p. 277) 
Janaway’s remarks on this respect, I believe, are derived from 
Schopenhauer’s confusing description of Ideas. In addition to the first 
definition of presented above, Schopenhauer describes Ideas in the 
following words: 
the Platonic Idea is necessarily object, something known, a representation, 
and precisely, but only, in this respect is it different from the thing-in-
itself. It has laid aside merely the subordinate forms of the phenomenon, 
all of which we include under the principle of sufficient reason; or rather it 
has not yet entered into them. But it has retained the first and most 
universal form, namely that of the representation in general, that of being 
object for a subject […] it is even the whole thing-in-itself, only under the 
form of representation. Here lies the ground of the great agreement 
between Plato and Kant, although in strict accuracy that of which they both 
speak is not the same. (WW I p. 175) 
 As Janaway presents it, there is no clear position Ideas could 
consistently occupy within Schopenhauer’s system, for allegedly they are 
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“to repose somewhere between appearances (representation) and the thing in 
itself” (Janaway, 1989, p. 27). As he points out somewhere else, “Ideas 
seem forced to serve as both thing in itself and representation, when these 
two categories were supposedly mutually exclusive at the outset” (Janaway, 
1994, p. 61). This is so because Schopenhauer’s introduction of Ideas has to 
find a place within a philosophical system that owes most of its central 
elements to the Kantian and Platonic accounts. Janaway understands Ideas 
in Schopenhauer as a “compromise, between the quasi-Platonic notion of 
the ‘better consciousness’, the Kantian epistemological framework, and the 
doctrines of the primacy of the will […]” (Janaway, 1989, p. 278).10 
Janaway explicitly expresses his scepticism by saying that “he 
[Schopenhauer] is still prepared to make the extremely dubious statement” 
(Janaway, 1994, p. 61), in §23 and §31, that asserts that, in the whole, the 
inner meaning of Kant’s and Plato’s doctrines are the same. By adopting 
Ideas, Janaway believes, Schopenhauer introduces a confusing element that 
does not cohere fully either with the Kantian elements of the doctrine nor 
the Platonic. The answer to his concerns has to meet both the requirements 
of clarifying how consistently those elements are brought together and of 
establishing whether there is any “place” for Ideas to occupy. 
Janaway bases his concern on the main premise that Schopenhauer 
bluntly divides the world into two irreducible and exhaustive categories, viz. 
the noumenon, identified with the Will, and the objects of intuitive 
empirical representation. The main critique to be made about 
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Schopenhauer’s position in this respect is the difficulty of introducing an 
element that borrows its characteristics from both the Kantian thing in itself 
and the Platonic original notion of Idea. Janaway’s main critique of the 
doctrine in its entirety is that Ideas are to “repose” somewhere between the 
Kantian notion of thing-in-itself and the “normal” kind of perceptual 
experience. It is true, as Schopenhauer presents them, that Ideas exhibit both 
Kantian and Platonic elements that make them difficult to comprehend. 
Nevertheless, I believe an answer to these worries must establish from the 
outset that Schopenhauer’s view about the distinction between the ‘in itself’ 
and representation is rather un-Kantian. 
More concerns on Ideas have been raised apart from those of 
Janaway. Such comments, although originating from a slightly different 
position, portray a similar view of Ideas as “unfitting” in Schopenhauer’s 
system, thus disregarding their necessity and consistency. These are the 
critiques raised by Bryan Magee in his thorough analysis of Schopenhauer’s 
system. Although Magee clarifies many aspects of Schopenhauer’s thought, 
I believe his concerns over the doctrine of Ideas errs in giving a clear 
account of their importance. Magee’s (1997) scepticism arises from his 
worry about Ideas successfully achieving the role that Schopenhauer 
intended them to have in the explanation of nature (p. 239). From 
Schopenhauer’s own characterization of Ideas, they are mainly presented as 
the explanation of the unity found in individual perceptual representations 
acting as their prototypes. They are also presented as the solution to the 
difficulties arising from the relation between the noumenal and intuitive 
representation. The main role of Ideas is to explain why some features are 
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shared by different individuals in perceptual representation, e.g. why every 
dog is like every other dog or every tree is like every other tree. Magee 
(1997) says: 
And I am not convinced that the Platonic Ideas — adduced primarily to 
explain the existence of genera and species — are necessary to 
Schopenhauer's philosophy at all. A careful shave with Occam's razor 
could, I suspect, succeed in removing these without trace. (p. 239) 
Magee’s concerns over the role Ideas play in Schopenhauer’s system, are 
derived from the uncertain role they have in explaining the old problem of 
“the one and the many”. On these lines, Magee (1997) continues his 
remarks: 
I cannot help suspecting that they were introduced ad hoc at this point and 
then got out of hand. I suspect that the reason for their introduction was 
that — without having at his disposal any of the conceptual apparatus since 
made available to us by Darwin and the subsequent development of 
biology — Schopenhauer could not see how else to explain the fact that 
everything is like something else: every sparrow is like every other 
sparrow, every blade of grass like every other blade of grass, every star 
like every other star, and so on, throughout the whole of the known 
universe, regardless of the evident unconnectedness of individual things 
with each other in time as well as in space. (p. 239) 
The introduction of Ideas, Magee (1997) continues, has the unthought 
consequence,  
of making Platonic Ideas an indispensable feed‐pipe between the 
noumenon and the world of phenomena. As such they became the third 
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constituent of total reality […] whereas Schopenhauer's philosophy makes 
so much of presenting itself to us as an account of reality in terms of two 
irreducible categories — the noumenon and phenomena — it actually 
makes use of three; what he shows us is not a two‐decker reality consisting 
of will and representations but a three‐decker reality consisting of will, 
Platonic Ideas and representations. (p. 239) 
There are two main propositions that summarise Magee’s critique. 
The first is that Magee understands Ideas, in their role as the explanatory 
element of the connectedness of individual things, as being on par with a 
scientific method of explanation in our understanding of nature. They are 
rendered unnecessary in the light of the development of evolutionary 
biology, or any other science that does not need to appeal to eternal and 
unchanging Ideas in order to explain nature at that level. Unity in nature, 
Magee would say, can easily find its explanation in a scientific 
understanding of the world through biology. The second proposition, that 
Magee shares with Janaway, is that he understands Schopenhauer’s system 
as being constituted by ‘two irreducible categories’, viz. the thing in itself 
and the phenomena, understood as perceptual representation, rendering 
Ideas as a ‘third constituent of reality’. I believe this assumption to be 
misleading for it sustains that the world, as Schopenhauer would understand 
it, is only constituted by these two ‘types of things’ and does not give space 
for any other. Therefore, Magee sees Ideas as a ‘third constituent of total 
reality’ introduced into Schopenhauer’s system that does not cohere with his 
initial project of the world as being just Will and representation. There is a 
misunderstanding on Magee’s part about Schopenhauer’s intentions when 
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adopting Ideas.  As I shall present in this chapter, I believe these 
propositions to err in the analysis of Schopenhauer’s intentions when 
adopting the doctrine and in assessing the corresponding place for Ideas to 
occupy within his doctrine.  
Janaway’s and Magee’s assumption that Ideas constitute a “third” 
element in Schopenhauer’s philosophy makes it difficult to include them in 
an account that pretends to be clear about the demarcation of the boundaries 
between the thing in itself and phenomena. Moreover, such a view could be 
misleading if it assumes more pieces of ontology than intended by 
Schopenhauer and may change the outcome of the whole project. In sum, 
one could distinguish three interrelated claims in Magee’s and Janaway’s 
comments, which I will focus on and attempt to resolve in this chapter: 1) 
That there is an inconsistency between the Kantian and Platonic elements of 
Schopenhauer’s account, which make of Ideas a strange element to 
introduce into the system, 2) That the thing in itself and phenomenal world 
understood as perceptual phenomena are two irreducible and exhaustive 
categories, and 3) That the second category, i.e. the one of phenomena, is 
restricted to objects of intuitive perceptual representation subject to the 
PSR.  
 
 By responding to these worries in the following discussions, I will 
turn my attention to the Kantian and Platonic elements of the doctrine, in 
order to clarify the first aforementioned concern This is necessary as 
Schopenhauer’s use of Ideas is restricted to his commitments to both these 
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doctrines. By considering the thing in itself and phenomena as exclusive, 
and identifying the latter with what one understands as perceptual 
representation, there seems to be no other place for Ideas to repose inthan a 
“third realm” separated from the two already mentioned. I believe that a 
way to understand how Ideas “fit” within Schopenhauer’s system, is to 
clarify their explanatory role in our understanding of nature. Contrary to 
what Magee seems to imply, Ideas are not intended to complete the 
ontology of the world, but they are meant to complete our understanding of 
it. 
2.2 Kantian and Platonic Elements in the Doctrine of Ideas 
 
Hilde S. Hein’s comments on Schopenhauer’s Ideas highlight their 
mixed meaning. She believes that, because Ideas are intended to have a 
Platonic meaning while they also take on some of the characteristics of the 
Kantian thing-in-itself, “we have grounds for suspicion that in fact, 
Schopenhauer used the Ideas in a very un-Platonic sense” (Hein, 1966, p. 
124). While considering the Kantian aspects of the doctrine and the type of 
nomenclature that permeates the whole of his philosophy, Schopenhauer’s 
notion of Ideas departs moderately from the original metaphysical meaning 
found in Plato’s account. Although similar to Plato’s, the position Ideas 
occupy in Schopenhauer’s system is undeniably conditioned by Kantian 
premises. Ideas are introduced by Schopenhauer as a necessary element 
derived from the Kantian influence evinced in the whole of his account.   
As Hein (1966) presents it, Schopenhauer’s use of the doctrine of 
Ideas intends to introduce them by giving them a rather Platonic meaning 
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(pp. 135-136). These act as forms or prototypes of the vast number of 
individual things found in representation. Moreover, Schopenhauer’s own 
claims about the meaning and use of the notion, in addition to references to 
ancient commentators on Plato (such as Diogenes Laertius),11 explicitly 
state the sort of interpretation he is trying to introduce into his system. He 
says that “the word [Idea] is always to be understood in its genuine and 
original meaning, given to it by Plato” (WW I p. 129). Nevertheless, this 
does not secure a complete and identical assimilation of the Platonic 
doctrine. Let us remember that Schopenhauer’s system is erected from the 
Kantian idea that the world is the representation of a thing in itself.  In 
Schopenhauer, the thing in itself is identified with the Will, and as such, it 
cannot be known by the subject as perceptual representations. His adoption 
of the doctrine of Ideas must find a place within a system built on and 
permeated by a Kantian doctrine and terminology, something that 
Schopenhauer himself is aware of. Schopenhauer warns against the Kantian 
misuse of the term and goes further for a characterization of Ideas, although 
in a Platonic manner, with Kantian notes.  
The main premise shared by the Kantian and Platonic accounts, for 
Schopenhauer, is that the everyday world (the world of experience or 
perceptual representation) is an always-changing fleeting “illusion” that 
only stands as the counterpart of something eternal and “truly real”. An 
example of this awareness is found in §31 where he explicitly states that the 
inner meaning of the Kantian and Platonic doctrines “is wholly the same; 
that both declare the visible world to be a phenomenon which in itself is 
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void and empty, and which has meaning and borrowed reality only through 
the thing that expresses itself in it (the thing-in-itself in the one case, and the 
Idea in the other)” (WW I p.172). Moreover, Schopenhauer goes on to try to 
bring the terminology of both doctrines even closer by saying that space, 
time and causality, as arrangements of our intellect, bring about the 
apprehension of things where “the one being of each kind [or Ideas] that 
alone really exists, manifests itself to us as a plurality of homogeneous 
beings […]” (WW I p. 173). Despite Janaway’s remarks on the issue, the 
similarities between both doctrines seem ideal for Schopenhauer in his 
attempt to merge them. Schopenhauer introduces Ideas in a way that 
attempts to agree with both the Platonic and the Kantian accounts, thus 
giving rise to an apparent tension. On the one hand, he has to make this 
doctrine compatible with the notion of an eternal thing-in-itself outside 
space, time and causality, and consequently unknowable by the subject; and, 
on the other, with a strictly Platonic notion of Ideas as the only true object 
of knowledge. Since in the Platonic and Kantian doctrines these two 
different features stand for what it is “truly real”, Schopenhauer is left with 
some constraints for introducing Ideas into his account.  
Schopenhauer is already committed to the idea that the world is the 
representation, and that the thing in itself cannot be the object of knowledge. 
He expresses this explicitly in §22 by saying that the thing-in-itself “as such 
is never object, since all object is its mere appearance or phenomenon, and 
not in itself” (WW I p. 110). He is also committed to an apparent Platonic 
use of the term thus allowing Ideas to be objects of knowledge as “fixed 
grade of the will’s objectification” (WW I p. 130). While Schopenhauer 
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agrees with Kant in asserting that the world is just representation of the 
thing-in-itself, he also agrees with Plato in that Ideas are “more real” than 
individual things. He accepts that the thing-in-itself is unknowable and that 
Ideas are objects of knowledge, while both stand as the “more real” 
counterparts of individual perceptual objects. Ideas, then, are presented as 
somewhere between these two notions. The sense, though, in which Ideas 
can be known differs from the normal use of “knowledge” when referring to 
individual objects of empirical representation. By making use of Kantian 
terminology, Schopenhauer presents the Idea as “original unchanging forms 
and properties of all natural bodies” (WW I p. 169) that, as such, “remains 
unchanged and as one and the same, and the principle of sufficient reason 
has no meaning for it” (WW I p. 169). This means that, in a Kantian sense, 
Ideas are also presented as outside the categories of space and time, and 
therefore they cannot be known in the same way that objects of perceptual 
experience can. Ideas, then, are unknowable as long as we are concerned 
with the knowledge of individual things by means of the PSR, for they are 
outside of it. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer still allows them to be objects of 
knowledge, and “this can happen only by abolishing individuality of the 
knowing subject” (WW I p. 169), through aesthetic experience.  
I believe we can rely on White’s (2011) interpretation of the doctrine 
when assuming that there are two main reasons, both shared by 
Schopenhauer and Plato, for introducing Ideas (p. 134). Moreover, they 
seem to arise from what Schopenhauer believes is fundamentally shared by 
the accounts of Kant and Plato. This would make the merging of their 
accounts much less doubtful. As we have seen, Schopenhauer’s use of Ideas 
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gets closer to that intended by Plato in its original sense, while assuming a 
Kantian background and nomenclature. White argues that the common 
elements in both Plato’s and Schopenhauer’s accounts give origin to the 
same requirements for the introduction of Ideas. On Schopenhauer’s side, 
these reasons are constrained by the inherited Kantian elements he adopts in 
his philosophy. The first reason White presents is that Ideas solve the 
problem of universals. Ideas, once again, are “the unity that has fallen into 
plurality by virtue of the temporal and spatial forms of our intuitive 
apprehension” (WW I p. 234). They are introduced, White sustains, from 
the necessity to explain the unity individual things exhibit in perceptual 
representations. That role cannot be given to the thing-in-itself for it can 
never be the object of knowledge. Ideas are presented as an answer to the 
problem of “the one and the many” (White, 2011, p. 134). They stand as the 
eternal unity that is represented as plurality by the forms of the intellect. 
Ideas, White claims, are introduced based on the necessity to deal with the 
problem of “the one and the many” and are the unity ante rem, for they 
stand as the “more real” counterpart of representation, thus having, in 
Schopenhauer’s words, “an objective real existence” (WW II p. 366). This 
interpretation, while it coheres with the definition of Ideas given at the 
beginning, also coheres with the Kantian and Platonic elements that 
constrain Schopenhauer’s system. 
White (2011) believes that the second reason for introducing the 
doctrine of Ideas in Schopenhauer’s and Plato’s systems is that they are 
needed as objects of knowledge (pp. 134-135). This arises from 
Schopenhauer’s claims on what constitutes the objects of “real knowledge”, 
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in contraposition with objects of “normal” perceptual experience. In §31 of 
the first volume, he states, in Plato’s own words, that since the world of 
experiences is never truly real because it changes and is subject to the PSR, 
the only real knowledge to be acquired is one of the Ideas. About this, 
Schopenhauer says that “thus only of them [Ideas] can there be a knowledge 
in the proper sense, for the object of such a knowledge can be only that 
which always and in every respect (and hence in-itself) is” (WW I p. 171). 
Again, being committed to the Kantian doctrine that the world of perceptual 
experience is representation of an unknowable thing-in-itself, White (2011) 
says, Schopenhauer needs to present an object of knowledge that represents 
a “more real” alternative from the fleeting and illusory world of appearances 
(p. 135). Ideas maintain their status as the “more real” counterpart of objects 
of perceptual experience while they stand as objects of real knowledge. This 
is the reason why Schopenhauer adds a high value to art; the subject of 
artistic contemplation knows objects in a “deeper way”.  
It is important to consider two main propositions that summarise 
succinctly Schopenhauer’s constraints when adopting the doctrine. The first 
is that Ideas are not to be identified with the Kantian notion of the thing-in-
itself. Since Schopenhauer allows them to be objects of knowledge, reached 
through aesthetic experience, Ideas cannot play the same role of the thing-
in-itself within the system. Due to his Kantian commitments, Schopenhauer 
could have never equated Ideas and the thing-in-itself; thus they must be 
presented as separated elements. If there is to be a blunt distinction between 
the world of the thing in itself and representation, Ideas still are to be 
considered as part of the latter, i.e. as part of the phenomenal world, though 
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different from perceptual experience. Schopenhauer addresses this by saying 
that “Idea and thing-in-itself are not for us absolutely one and the same. [...] 
for us the Idea is only the immediate, and therefore adequate, objectivity of 
the thing-in-itself, which itself, however, is the will-the will in so far as it is 
not yet objectified, has not yet become representation” (WW I p. 174). The 
thing in itself, being free from all forms of knowledge, including the most 
universal of all, “that of being-object-for-a-subject”, is not representation 
(see Section 1.1). 
The second proposition is that, regardless of the first proposition, 
and vaguely following the original meaning of the term, Ideas still stand as a 
more real counterpart of individual objects of perceptual experience, acting 
as their eternal unchanging forms. This follows from both Kantian and 
Platonic accounts. In order to understand the role assigned to Ideas, one 
must be aware of the type of relationship these have with the thing-in-itself 
and with individual objects of perceptual experience.  More importantly, 
one should be able to understand why Ideas could appear as the necessary 
link between the apparently otherwise unrelated thing-in-itself and 
individual objects.  At this point, some major confusions arise. As was 
presented in Magee’s and Janaway’s critiques, it is easy to assume that there 
is no place for Ideas to occupy in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. They 
certainly are not to be identified with the thing-in-itself (or the noumenon), 
nor are individual objects of perceptual experience, although they stand as 
their eternal forms. If one assumes that Schopenhauer bluntly categorises 
that everything there is in the world is either noumenon or intuitive 
appearance, then there is certainly no space for Ideas to occupy. From this, 
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two non-contradictory assumptions can arise, which is also where we can 
find both concerns presented above. The first assumption is that, while 
Schopenhauer intends to demarcate all that there is as being either thing in 
itself or intuitive phenomenon, there is no space for Ideas to occupy for they 
are not described as either. The second assumption is that when including 
Kantian and Platonic elements into his philosophy, Schopenhauer 
understands the world as being constituted by at least two “types” of things. 
The thing in itself and intuitive phenomena would represent two different 
things in Schopenhauer’s ontology. By including Ideas, he would be also 
including a third type into his ontology. If this is the case, the world would 
not be just constituted by the thing in itself and intuitive phenomena, but 
also by Ideas. I believe that the first of these two assumptions is the easiest 
to clarify. In what follows, I expect to clarify a distinction that is necessary 
to refute these assumptions: the epistemological and ontological distinction. 
I believe that Schopenhauer’s description of Ideas has enough ground for 
establishing that they are emphasised more as having an epistemological 
mark rather than an ontological one. The role Ideas have is pivotal for 
Schopenhauer’s construction of his idealistic traits.12 Without Ideas, I intend 
to show, it does not result that nature is incomplete, but rather that our 
knowledge of it is. 
2.3 The role of Ideas in Nature  
 
As shown in the previous section, Ideas are not to be identified with 
the thing in itself nor with representation as objects of perceptual 
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experience. Nevertheless, they are strictly related to the latter and their 
introduction intends to explain individual objects of perceptual 
representation at a certain level. In this section, I intend to present how this 
is so. Paraphrasing John E. Atwell’s words on the issue, a succinct 
characterisation of the role Ideas have in nature could be as follows: Ideas 
are presented by Schopenhauer for a philosophical level explanation of 
changes in nature, thus serving as “third factors” that allow us to reach an 
understanding of nature at a level impossible through science (Atwell, 1995 
p. 130). I agree with Atwell’s accurate analysis of Schopenhauer’s necessity 
for the inclusion of Ideas into his system. This interpretation, as seen from 
Magee’s comments, is not commonplace among commentators. Following 
this, my intention is to demonstrate how Ideas represent a different 
explanatory level of nature not reached by science. Another aim of this 
section is to address Janaway’s and Magee’s worries, particularly 2) and 3), 
on the restrictiveness of the distinction between thing in itself and 
phenomena.  I proceed in two stages. The first is to clarify Schopenhauer’s 
position on scientific explanation and why Ideas do not belong to it. This 
implies acknowledging the type of relation that exists between philosophical 
and scientific explanation. The second stage consists of presenting what 
kind of explanation Ideas actually give regarding our understanding of 
natural perceptual phenomena. Ideas are introduced as a qualitates occultae 
that establish, ante rem, intuitive perceptual representation.   
 In order to understand Schopenhauer’s thoughts on science, there 
are two aspects of his philosophy to bear in mind. The first one is 
Schopenhauer’s commitment to an analytical method of enquiry “which 
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proceeds from either facts of external experience or facts of consciousness” 
(BM p. 127) and, following Vojislav Bozickovic (2011), its importance in a 
non-conceptual knowledge of causal relations and objects (p. 15). 
Consequently, philosophy’s task is to follow this procedure of enquiry. The 
analytical method “goes from the facts, the particular, to the propositions, 
the universal, or from consequents to grounds” (WW II p. 122) and, as 
Bozickovic (2011, p. 12) points out, it uses as a basis the possibility of a 
non-conceptual knowledge of objects through the faculty of understanding. 
As Bozickovic (2011) rightly notes, Schopenhauer is committed to the 
claim that in addition to a conceptual knowledge of objects “there is also a 
non-conceptual knowledge of them” (p. 13). This has its foundation in 
Schopenhauer’s comments on the faculty of understanding, shared by 
humans and animals, “which by means of its unique form of causality and 
by means of what underlies this, pure sensibility (that is, time and space), 
the understanding first creates and produces this objective external world 
from raw stuff of a few sensations in the sense organs” (FR p. 52). 
Following, the way in which the philosophical task is carried out must start 
from the objects of perceptual experience in order to reach, at a later stage, 
the universal.  
Schopenhauer’s opinion on science is based on the importance of 
understanding the world starting from perceptual experience. Nevertheless, 
one should be reminded of Schopenhauer’s strong idealism when 
considering his comments on the faculty of understanding. In order to 
understand the relation between science and philosophy, one must be aware 
that although Schopenhauer allows for a non-conceptual knowledge of 
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objects, the external world is still the product of our intellect, and as such it 
is still the object for a subject. One should not believe, Schopenhauer says, 
that the world “is completely objective-real and would be able to exist 
without our having anything to do with it” (FR p. 53). The world of 
perceptual experience comes to exist “only when the understanding […] 
becomes active and applies its single and only form, the law of causality 
[…]” (FR p. 53). Schopenhauer’s philosophical investigation uses this truth 
as a starting point as much as a conclusion, as do his views on scientific 
explanation. Although different, the scientific and philosophical 
explanations of the world start from the basis that whatever there is to make 
sense of constitutes the world as representation. They focus, in other words, 
on the world as the object of knowledge for a conscious subject; they focus 
on representation.  
The second element to consider is that, as Julian Young (2005) 
rightly observes, Schopenhauer sees a “non-hostile, collaborative 
relationship between science and philosophy” (p. 55). This is based on 
Schopenhauer’s remarks that “what sciences presuppose and lay down as 
the basis and limit of their explanation is precisely the real problem of 
philosophy, which consequently begins where the sciences leave off” (WW 
I pp. 81-82). This, Young (2005) thinks, suggests a view of philosophy 
where one of its main tasks is the “completion of the scientific image of 
reality” (p. 56). But, what kind of explanation does science provide? By 
making use of a rather Kantian nomenclature, Schopenhauer refers to 
science as the “systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of 
sufficient reason” that “tells us nothing more than the relation of one 
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representation to another” (WW I p. 28). This principle, as it was presented 
in the introductory chapter, determines at least a large part of the objects of 
representation and is considered by Schopenhauer as the “basis of all 
science”, for it is the one that connects all the members of the scientific 
system (FR p. 9). Science, concerned with the kinds of relations given in 
empirical representation and having as a basis the PSR in its first form, aims 
to explain the connectedness of experiential phenomena under causal laws. 
Nevertheless, the scope of explanation reached by science is not universal as 
it leaves the ultimate aspect of nature unexplained.  
Following Young’s (2005) comments, we could rely on a reading 
where Schopenhauer seems to be committed to the idea that science 
explains particular phenomena by subsuming them under causal laws (p. 
56). Nevertheless, Young (2005) continues, although science gives us 
certain knowledge about what it is that connects different phenomena, 
regularities are not regarded as law unless there is an “inner conditioning”, 
on which it is grounded (p. 56). This “inner conditioning” Young refers to, 
is mentioned by Schopenhauer when he states that, although we get 
knowledge of the laws that regulate interaction from aetiological 
explanation, “we do not obtain the slightest information about the inner 
nature of any of these phenomena” (WW I p. 97). This, which is also called 
natural force, constitutes a basis from which aetiology “calls the unalterable 
constancy with which the manifestation of such a force whenever its known 
conditions are present, a law of nature” (WW I p. 97). This is as far as 
aetiology can go, because “the force itself that is manifested, the inner 
nature of the phenomena that appear in accordance with those laws, remain 
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for it an eternal secret” (WW I p. 97). In other words, science, or the 
aetiological explanation of the causes of individual objects of experiential 
representation, cannot explain the natural forces that operate in laws of 
nature. It is bound to explain and give a sense of the changes that occur 
under the PSR, i.e. under space, time and causality, while it establishes the 
regularities found in their connectedness (laws). What this lacks, and what 
would be left for philosophy to explain, is the “inner nature” of these 
connections and of the objects of experiential representation. These natural 
forces that determine, outside the limits of the PSR, how these connections 
take place in the forms of natural laws are excluded from the scientific 
explanation of nature. In Schopenhauer’s own words, sciences are able to 
explain how laws operate in perceptual representation. They show “the law, 
the rule, observed by these forces in regard to their entry into space and time 
in each case. But whatever we may do, the forces themselves remain 
qualitates occultae” (WW I p. 122, emphasis in original). 
 I believe one can sum up the explanatory role of science and where 
it falls short in explaining nature by considering Schopenhauer’s words on 
aetiology. Since sciences give us an aetiological explanation of the world, 
one can summarise Schopenhauer’s thoughts by looking into a key passage 
on the topic. On aetiology, he says it:  
teaches us that according to the law of cause and effect, this definite 
condition of matter produces that other condition, and with this it has 
explained it […] it, therefore, determines for them their position in time 
and space according to a law whose definite content has been taught by 
experience, yet whose universal form and necessity are known to us 
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independently of experience […] this is called natural force and lies 
outside the province of etiological [sic] explanation […]. (WW I p. 97) 
Science cannot provide an explanation of the natural forces, the 
universal forms, or qualitates occultae, that operate at a level prior to our 
knowledge of the laws that take place in time and space in individual 
objects of experience. The philosophical task, then, lies in identifying these 
forms, and the aptitude for philosophy that “consists precisely in what Plato 
put it in, namely knowing the one in the many and the many in the one” 
(WW I p. 82), in other words, knowing universals. Schopenhauer’s view on 
the relation between science and philosophy is clear: Philosophy is 
concerned with an explanation of nature that is not provided by a scientific 
explanation of the world. This means to focus on the universal forms, 
natural forces, or qualitates occultae, that constitute the inner nature 
(outside the PSR) of phenomena. The philosophical task consists in 
knowing and presenting the universal forms that, not being subject to the 
PSR, differ from objects of perceptual experience. 
The importance of this fact might help us determine the 
restrictiveness of the distinction between the thing in itself and its 
phenomena, at the same time that it clarifies the possible status of Ideas. 
Schopenhauer’s explicit statement that the Idea is “necessarily object” or “a 
representation” (See section 2.1), should give us the first clue for assessing 
the real meaning and scope of the world as representation. I believe the first 
step in giving this explanation must begin by looking at Schopenhauer’s 
strong naturalistic conception of the world, derived from his conception that 
there is no ontological gap between the Will as thing-in-itself and 
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representation. The world of perceptual experiences, as understood by 
Schopenhauer, is the spatio-temporal representation of a timeless thing-in-
itself, which “is free from all forms of knowledge, even the most universal, 
namely that of being the object for a subject; in other words, it is something 
entirely different from representation” (WW I p. 128). Any investigation of 
the world of representation must find its starting point in the 
acknowledgement of this truth, viz. the truth that what distinguishes 
representation from the thing in itself, is that representation appears as an 
object for a knowing subject. Moreover, it is only for representation that 
plurality and the forms of intellect apply, for the thing-in-itself must be 
understood as “something to which the condition of the possibility of 
plurality, that is, the principium individuationis, is foreign” (WW I p. 130). 
Nevertheless, the fact that plurality can only be applied to representation 
does not imply that the latter consists solely of objects that present such 
form. For the thing in itself, spatio-temporal forms do not apply, nor do any 
of the forms that have the object-subject relation as their basis. Nor does this 
imply that, once the thing in itself appears as an object (in any possible 
form) for a subject, Schopenhauer is adding another category to the 
inventory of substances in the world. If the thing in itself is not even an 
object, there is no ontological category for it to occupy. From the very 
beginning, the possibility of it being the object of knowledge is excluded, 
and all reference to it must start with it being objectified. Referring to this, 
Schopenhauer says: “the objective world, the world as representation is not 
the only side of the world, but merely its external side, so to speak, and that 
the world has an entirely different side which is its innermost being, its 
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kernel, the thing-in-itself [...] calling it “will” after the most immediate of its 
objectifications” (WW I pp. 30-31). 
 The world of representation is the thing-in-itself, i.e. the Will made 
an object for a subject. This condition for representation is not limited to the 
objects found in perceptual experience, but includes anything that 
constitutes any of the representational forms derived from the subject-object 
relation. Everything that is representation is equally Will (as thing-in-itself), 
without exception. As Schopenhauer puts it, “the will reveals itself just as 
completely and just as much in one oak as in millions” (WW I p. 128). I 
believe one can make the first distinction between the thing in itself and 
phenomena (or representation) in the following terms: The thing in itself is 
free from all forms imposed by any knowing subject and, as such, it is 
(intuitively) unknowable. Opposed to the phenomenon, it is not and can not 
be the object of knowledge. A phenomenon, on the other hand, is subject to 
the forms derived from the most basic representational relation of all, viz. to 
be object-for-a-subject.  
As Schopenhauer puts it, the thing in itself can be presented to a 
subject in a multiplicity of forms, i.e. a multitude of ways in which it can be 
an object for a knowing subject. The Will manifests itself in varying degrees 
at different levels of its objectification. These “degrees of visibility” (WW I 
p. 128) vary depending on the level in which the thing-in-itself is presented 
as an object for a subject. Schopenhauer says: 
There is a higher degree of this objectification in the plant than in the 
stone, a higher degree in the animal than in the plant; indeed the will’s 
passage into visibility, its objectification, has gradations as endless as those 
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between the feeblest twilight and the brightest sunlight, the loudest tone 
and the softest echo. (WW I p. 128) 
Ideas are these “fixed grade of the will’s objectification” (WW I, p. 
130). and they find their relation to objects of experience in the way that the 
latter constitute an exemplification or instantiation of the first. An individual 
tree exemplifies the Idea of a tree. It exemplifies, or is just one instantiation 
of a certain grade, of the Will’s objectification. The primordial and most 
immediate relation between objects of perceptual experience and Ideas lies 
in that the latter “exist as the unattained patterns of these [objects], or as the 
eternal forms of things” (WW I p. 129). For now, a parallelism could be 
drawn in saying that the most immediate function Ideas play in our 
understanding of nature (or more specifically, of perceptual representation), 
as pointed out by Atwell (1995), is their role as a sort of natural species (p. 
131).  
Ideas are thus introduced in Schopenhauer’s philosophy firstly as the 
universal and eternal forms whose knowledge is unreachable by science, 
and whose uniformity is seen in perceptual representation as a law. On this, 
Schopenhauer says that “every universal, original force of nature is, in its 
inner essence, nothing but the objectification of the Will at a low grade, and 
we call every such grade an eternal Idea in Plato’s sense. But the law of 
nature is the relation of the Idea to the form of its phenomenon” (WW I p. 
134). An Idea, or fixed grade of objectivity of the Will, then, “lies entirely 
outside the chain of causes […] in aetiology, however, in this case physics, 
it is seen as an original force, i.e. a qualitas occulta” (WW I p. 131) that 
rules over matter presented in perceptual experience. These rules, 
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Schopenhauer says, “can never be called either effect or cause, but are the 
prior and presupposed conditions of all causes and effects through which 
their own inner being is unfolded and revealed” (WW I p. 130) and, as such, 
they lie completely outside the causal chain of relations.  In the case of the 
most basic and fundamental forces of nature, they “exhibit themselves as 
the lowest grade of the will’s objectification” (WW I p. 130). Therefore, in 
order to make sense of, for example, an apple falling from a tree, one must 
make reference to different grades of objectification of the Will. One can 
exhaust the explanation through causes until these original forces are 
reached, an explanatory point which ultimately makes reference to a 
universal form for which the causal explanation is not available. In this case, 
the most primordial force in place is that of gravity, which, although 
presented as representation in time and space, has an inner nature that is 
timeless and outside of the chain of causality for it is constitutive of those 
changes in material bodies. When the apple falls, it is the Idea of gravity 
that is operating in that particular spatio-temporal instance. In the same way, 
it is the Idea of the apple tree that is operating in the particular instance of 
the tree that gave origin to the apple. If Ideas are to be seen through science 
as natural forces, as I believe Schopenhauer presents them, gravity, as an 
example of these eternal unchangeable forms, is just the representation in 
time and space of the thing-in-itself in a similar way that the apple itself is. 
To the question: Are Ideas real? I believe one could answer, they are as real 
as any object of representation is. As with any object of representation, their 
existence depends on the existence of a subject, of the pure subject of 
knowledge (see Section 1.1). Ideas are reached through the knowledge of 
  
50 
objects of perceptual experience and are not, as many misinterpret, mystical 
ontological entities. 
 Ideas are the fixed, eternal forms of the various grades of 
objectification of the thing-in-itself, thus shaping perceptual representation. 
Their explanatory role as natural forces cannot be subjected to the principle 
of sufficient reason. The notion of natural force, or Idea, used by 
Schopenhauer, therefore, must go beyond the causal explanation of changes 
in perceptual nature. The role of Ideas lies in their capacity to stand as the 
qualitates occultae from which experiential representation is shaped, while 
they still remain part of the world as a representation while being objects of 
knowledge. The scope and reach of the difference between the thing in itself 
and the world of representation include these eternal forms outside space 
and time, and therefore they can be seen as “third factors” that complement 
the scientific image of the world.  
This view does not contradict the role Schopenhauer gives Ideas as 
the objects of aesthetic contemplation. Ironically, Schopenhauer assigns the 
ultimate knowledge of reality not to the scientist, but to the artist. This, I 
believe, agrees with Young’s (1987) comments on the matter when he 
remarks that the universality of Ideas has to do “with the selectiveness of 
attention” (pp. 92-93) paid to objects of experience. Science would focus 
this attention only in terms of the object’s relation to other objects, never on 
its own essential characteristics. Nevertheless, I do not believe there is 
enough evidence to go further to state, as Young (1987) does, that Ideas 
“must be identified with ordinary natural objects for those are the only kind 
of objects there are in the phenomenal world” (p. 93). As I have made clear, 
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there is an ontological and epistemological difference to discern. That 
knowledge of Ideas is reached through objects of perceptual experience 
does not mean that they are objects of perceptual experience. The identity of 
Ideas and objects of perceptual experience represents another discussion, as 
could also be(as an analogy, for Ideas are not concepts) the identity between 
concepts and the objects of experience from which the subject reaches them.  
From what has been presented thus far, and with the aim of 
clarifying 2) and 3) from above, one can make the following 
distinctions.13For Schopenhauer, the world is mainly divided into the thing-
in-itself and its representation. As it has been presented, this distinction is 
based on the sole possibility of its knowledge. The thing in itself, by 
definition freed from all the representational forms, cannot be an object for a 
subject and hence it cannot be an object of knowledge. It lies outside any 
representational form and, as such, should stand as an eternal mystery. On 
the other hand, the world as representation is presented as anything that 
stands as an object in relation to a knowing subject and can take many 
shapes. On this basis, we could make the further distinction between two 
different objects of representation, viz. objects of perceptual experience and 
Ideas as their eternal forms. Objects of perceptual experience, like tables 
and chairs, stand to one another in a causal relation that is one of the forms 
of the PSR. Depending on the forms of the understanding, these are to be 
found in time and space and their connectedness is bound to these 
conditions. Ideas, on the other hand, stand as the eternal forms of individual 
                                                 
13
  Claim 2) states that the thing in itself and phenomenal world understood as perceptual 
phenomena are two irreducible and exhaustive categories, and claim 3) states that the 
second category, i.e. the one of phenomena, is restricted to objects of intuitive perceptual 
representation subject to the PSR.  
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objects of representation and their role in the explanation of nature 
complements the scientific image of the world. They also stand as the most 
immediate objectification of the thing in itself and hence they constitute part 
of the world as representation. Atwell (1995) observes rightly that without 
the doctrine of Ideas, changes in nature would have remained obscure due to 
science’s incapacity for explaining them. One way to understand what kind 
of explanation they are intended to give is the following: They represent the 
universal forms that, empty of material content, shape perceptual 
representation and the interaction among its objects. One could exemplify 
this by mentioning the previous example. If we are to ask why did an apple 
fall from a tree, reference to an original force has to be made. In this case, 
forces of gravitation are to be explained causally through mention of 
physical terms like space-time curvature and mass. Nevertheless, the further 
question of why this is so remains unexplained and the origins of this force 
remain and will remain a mystery, for the only access to its origin has as its 
basis the individual cases in an experience that are brought together by a 
unity understood as natural laws. Ideas are intended to “give the rule” to the 
interactions between objects of perceptual representations.  
There is certainly no basis for identifying objects of representation 
exclusively with objects of perceptual experience. There is no “place” for 
Ideas to occupy between the thing in itself and representation, for they 
actually are representation themselves. We see Ideas as the necessary object 
of knowledge that gives sense to the unity in perceptual experience. The 
misunderstanding that arises from the doctrine of Ideas extends to include 
worries about the doctrine of intelligible characters. By understanding the 
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role of these two doctrines, a final answer to the concerns raised by Janaway 




























3.1 The Problem of Individuation of Intelligible Characters  
 
In a similar way that he does with the doctrine of Ideas, Janaway 
draws our attention to a difficulty that arises from the description of 
Intelligible Character, viz. the difficulty of plurality and individuation. He 
does this in two articles in his discussion on the Intelligible Character., . 
Both articles, “Will and Nature” and “Necessity, Responsibility, and 
Character”, share the same line of criticisms and deep concerns about the 
problem. On Intelligible Characters, Janaway (1999) states:  
But this account of the intelligible character is troubling because it seems 
to fly in the face of Schopenhauer’s repeated assertion that the world at the 
level of the in itself is beyond individuation […] for Schopenhauer, if 
space and time are the principle of individuation, that is, that which makes 
it possible for there to be distinct individuals at all, and if the world in 
itself is expressly not in space and time […] then it follows that there are 
no spatio-temporal individuals in the world as it is in itself: at that level we 
can speak only of ‘what there is’ or ‘the world’ in a quite undifferentiated 
sense.” (p. 150) 
The problem with intelligible characters lies in the apparent 
contradiction between their independence from spatio-temporal 
determinations and the fact that they are to be individually related to each 
person, and therefore plural. This contradiction, Janaway (1999) correctly 
observes, arises from the fact that a consistent tenet of Schopenhauer’s 
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philosophy is that “the world in itself does not split up into separate 
individuals, that individuality is phenomenal only” (p. 150) and thus the 
possibility of the plurality of Intelligible characters should be excluded from 
the outset.  
Janaway presents some doubts concerning Schopenhauer’s solution 
to the difficulties on freedom of agency and responsibility by saying that,  
even if we grant Schopenhauer the step that if there is responsibility then 
there must be freedom somewhere in the system, and grant him the further 
consequence that whatever this freedom is must be something intelligible 
or non-empirical, there remains the serious problem of how this non-
empirical something can coherently be individual.” (Janaway 2012 p. 454) 
 By presenting Intelligible Characters as the “in itself essence of the thing”, 
Janaway believes, Schopenhauer is presumably opening the door for an 
utter contradiction, i.e. for the possibility of individuation outside 
representation independent of the spatio-temporal determinations. 
Individuation, Janaway (2012) says, “should not be obtained at the level of 
the ‘in itself', where the intelligible character is supposedly located” (p. 
454).  
Overall, Janaway’s concerns are based on the description of 
intelligible characters as independent of the spatio-temporal constraints that 
would allow their plurality and individuation. Not being objects of 
perceptual experience nor being identified with the Will as the thing in 
itself, but simply “located” at that level, Intelligible Characters would not 
only be difficult to place within Schopenhauer’s system, but their very 
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possibility ought to be dismissed. The difficulty raised by Janaway, as he 
puts it, is making sense of these spatio-temporally independent characters of 
which, nevertheless, each is related to a different individual subject while 
being part of the ‘in itself’.  
In a more positive light, Janaway makes mention of a passage in the 
Parerga and Paralipomena where Schopenhauer, in a rather obscure way, 
opens the door for a possible solution to the problem just posed. There, 
Schopenhauer says:  
individuality does not rest solely on the principium individuationis and so 
is not through and through mere phenomenon, but … it is rooted in the 
thing-in-itself, the will of the individual; for the character itself is 
individual. But how far its roots here go, is one of those questions which I 
do not undertake to answer. (PP II p. 227) 
However, this type of individuation is, it certainly must find its roots 
in a different principle than one that applies for objects of perceptual 
experience. It must, in other words, find a different source than the spatio-
temporal determinations that give origin to the PSR and hence to the 
necessary relation between objects of representation. In the light of 
Schopenhauer’s negative to further determine how this plurality is to be 
achieved, the rest of his system remains a possible source of enlightenment.  
The whole problem of characters as individual while also 
independent of the PSR is reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of Ideas, 
something that Janaways is aware of. On this, Janaway (2012) says that,  
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one recourse available to Schopenhauer lies in his notion of Ideas, which 
are plural and distinct from one another while also being non-spatio-
temporal. In his theory of artistic portraiture, Schopenhauer holds that each 
human individual’s character expresses a unique Idea. But in the context of 
freedom he does not address this question of non-empirical individuation 
[…] (p. 454). 
Nevertheless, what Janaway does not mention here is that the same 
type of question, i.e. the same problem about individuation and plurality 
outside the PSR, can also be attributed to the doctrine of Ideas. More than a 
possible solution, any parallel drawn between the two doctrines has to deal 
with the challenge of explaining how this “non-empirical individuation” 
takes place. In a similar vein to the question of Ideas constituting a “third 
category”, there is a challenge to be faced regarding Intelligible Characters 
and their status. The coherence of Intelligible Characters, Janaway says, 
remains open to the challenge of establishing whether the individual ought 
to be empirical and whether the empirical must be necessitated. Otherwise, 
there is the risk that human agency and responsibility, apart from being non-
empirical, would also be non-individual. In such a case, most of 
Schopenhauer’s argument runs the risk of falling down (see Janaway, 2012). 
Leaving the challenge open, Janaway refers to the difficulty of establishing 
the level in which Intelligible Characters are part of the ‘in itself’. He says 
that “there is enough elasticity in Schopenhauer’s account” (Janaway, 1999, 
p. 151) that may help us determine what we are in ourselves and hopefully 
make the individuation of characters an integral part of his metaphysics of 
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the Will. Janaway’s last words on Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine 
of Intelligible Characters explicitly acknowledge the issue at hand:  
As a result, there is a serious unclarity, at worst total contradiction, in the 
very idea that the free, non-necessitated inner essence that unfolds itself in 
my actions should be anything individual at all, that it should be an essence 
pertaining uniquely to me, this human being. (Janaway, 2012, p. 454)  
My intention is to show that this “unclarity” or “contradiction” Janaway is 
arguing for is not necessarily so. By resolving the difficulties emerging from 
Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine of Intelligible Characters, one 
could also expect to find an answer to the additional problem about the 
organic coherence of the elements in his system. As mentioned previously, I 
believe these difficulties originate in a further misunderstanding that was 
also applied to Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine of Ideas. Janaway 
mentions the doctrine of Ideas as a possible resource in resolving the 
problem of Intelligible Characters. But, for this to work, the possibility of 
their plurality outside the determinations of space and time still needs 
clarification. In spite of Janaway’s words on the openness and elasticity of 
Schopenhauer’s system to provide an answer to the problem of 
individuation in the doctrine of Intelligible Characters, we are still left with 
the further difficulty of solving the very same problem regarding the 
doctrine of Ideas. I believe this has its roots in the objection presented in 
Chapter Two regarding Ideas as “third categories”. In what follows I intend 
to show how this is so. 
Janaway’s concerns about the problem of plurality and 
individuation, it seems to me, are based on the main premise that Intelligible 
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Characters are to be found at the level of the ‘in itself’ (Janaway, 1999, p. 
151). As Janaway puts it, there is a challenge to be met by Schopenhauer in 
explaining how plurality and individuation are possible at this level. As he 
well points out, Schopenhauer, throughout his whole work, is adamant that 
plurality and individuation are the product of spatio-temporal 
determinations and do not exert their influence on the thing in itself. One 
example of this is found in §23 of The World as Will and Representation, 
where Schopenhauer says:  
it is only by means of time and space that something which is one 
and the same according to its nature and the concept appears as 
different, as a plurality of coexistent and successive things. 
Consequently, time and space are the principium individuationis 
[principle of individuation] […]” (WW I p. 113). 
Immediately following, Schopenhauer adds that “the will as thing-
in-itself lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason in all 
its forms […] although each of its phenomena is entirely subject to this 
principle […]” (WW I p. 113). The thing in itself, then, “is free from all 
plurality, although its phenomena in time and space are innumerable. It is 
itself one, yet not as an object is one, for the unity of an object is known 
only in contrast to possible plurality” (WW I p.113). This has the 
consequence that the spatio-temporal forms that determine the principle of 
individuation are only applicable to the phenomena of the thing in itself, i.e. 
to the world as representation as for its objectification. With these passages 
in mind, Schopenhauer’s description of Intelligible Characters rightly 
becomes problematic. As Janaway correctly points out, the world at the 
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level of the ‘in itself’ can only be referred to as being an undifferentiated 
unity. Moreover, the world at the level of the ‘in itself’ is not to be regarded 
as an object. For this to be the case, it is necessary that it be determined by 
the forms that allow for individuation.  
 In spite of Schopenhauer’s remarks, to locate Intelligible Characters 
at the level of the ‘in itself’ is, to say the least, confusing. We are left with a 
rather obscure account of what it means for Intelligible Characters to be part 
of the world of the ‘in itself’. Nevertheless, in the light of the obvious 
contradiction which Schopenhauer incurs by saying this, such assertions 
ought to be revised. In order to answer the question posed by Janaway on 
plurality and individuation, the premise of Intelligible Characters as being 
part of the ‘in itself’ must be challenged and clarified. This is to determine 
the type of question we are trying to pose. It seems to be, after all, the 
confusing status of Intelligible Characters that prompts the whole problem. 
Nevertheless, this clarification regarding Intelligible Characters is a 
necessary step in understanding what the origins of such status might be.  
To recapitulate briefly, I believe the difficulty of the individuation 
and plurality of Intelligible Characters, as Janaway presents it, is 
straightforward: due to his constant and repetitive assertions on the 
necessary conditions for plurality, Schopenhauer seems to enter into 
contradiction when he describes Intelligible Characters as being different 
and unique for each individual, and as being the ‘essence in itself of the 
thing’. The contradiction arises from the fact that the world, at the level of 
the ‘in itself’ cannot be individuated due to its independence from time and 
space, and hence from the PSR. Intelligible Characters, then, being free 
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from these determinations, and supposedly belonging to the world of the ‘in 
itself’, could not be individual nor plural.  
In spite of how the problem has been posed by Janaway, I believe 
there is a further distinction to be made from the outset. While Intelligible 
Characters’ independence from the PSR would impede them from being 
plural and individual, their belonging to the world at the level of the ‘in 
itself' makes the previous difficulty even more difficult. As Janaway 
describes, the world at that level can only be referred to as ‘what there is’ in 
an undifferentiated way. In order to provide a solution to the problem of 
individuation it is important to clarify how we understand that Intelligible 
Characters are the ‘essence in itself of the thing’ (BM p. 185). Depending 
on how this is interpreted, when addressing the problem of individuation we 
could find ourselves with a double challenge: explaining how plurality and 
individuation are possible independently of the spatio-temporal constraints; 
and explaining how plurality is possible at the level of the ‘in itself’. I 
believe there is a dual basis, extracted from Janaway’s concerns on the 
problem of individuation and plurality, that opens the possibility for this 
distinction. The first is Janaway’s mention of the Parerga passage where 
Schopenhauer opens the door for the possibility of non-empirical 
individuation, which is different from the plurality of the ‘in itself’. There, 
Schopenhauer is amenable to individuality not being strictly dependent on 
the PSR, but ‘rooted’ in the thing in itself. Nevertheless, we still require an 
explanation of what this really means. That individuality is “rooted” in the 
thing in itself, does not necessarily mean that Schopenhauer is opening the 
door for non-empirical plurality, but just that any sort of principle that may 
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allow this is found in the Will; such is the case with all representation. The 
second basis is Janaway’s remarks on the openness of Schopenhauer’s 
answer to the problem on individuation through the doctrine of Ideas, 
which, as Schopenhauer explicitly states, belong to the world of 
representation.  If this is the case, it strikes me as odd to see in 
Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine of Ideas a possible route to 
resolving the problem of individuation. Although it is true that the difficulty 
of plurality and individuation could be also assigned to Ideas if Intelligible 
Characters belong to the realm of the ‘in itself’, there is no parallel to be 
drawn between the two doctrines. Schopenhauer, as presented in the 
previous chapter, explicitly states that Ideas belong to representation. On the 
other hand, if the problem is derived from the Intelligible Characters’ 
independence from the determinations that allow individuality, then there 
could in fact be enough material in the rest of his system that could help us 
deal with it.  
The fact that Janaway does not make this distinction when posing 
the problem of individuation blurs the scope of the difficulty. Once this 
distinction is made it could render further implications in how to solve the 
problem. As mentioned earlier, an example of these implications relates to 
Janaway’s own awareness of the elasticity of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in 
providing an answer to the problem through Ideas. As presented in the 
previous chapter, Ideas do not belong to the world of the ‘in itself’ but they 
are still plural and individual, independent of the spatio-temporal 
constraints. If an interpretation of the Intelligible Characters’ belonging to 
the world of the ‘in itself’ locates them within the world as representation, 
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but describes them as free from the constraints that allow for individuation, 
then the challenge of explaining their individuation could be analogous to 
the explanation of plurality of Ideas. In such a case, individuation would not 
be explained at the level of the ‘in itself’, but rather at a non-empirical one. 
This would make Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine of Intelligible 
Characters analogous to the way Schopenhauer understands Ideas. As I 
intend to show such is the case, the possibility for the plurality and 
individuation of one and the other could possibly be found on a similar, if 
not on the same, basis. On these grounds, it is important to differentiate 
Intelligible Characters’ independence from the spatio-temporal constraints, 
which would not allow for their individuation nor their belonging to the 
world of the ‘in itself’ for they determine the approach taken to solve the 
problem. In order to make this clear, I believe the doors should be left open 
for the possibility that Schopenhauer’s use of some terminology is at times 
inconsistent with some previous uses that he himself presented.  
If the set of difficulties for the doctrine of Intelligible Characters has 
only to address the challenge of explaining non-empirical individuation, as I 
believe is mainly what Janaway hinted at when presenting the problem, then 
we come back to the same difficulty that I presented in Chapter Two. As 
occurred with Ideas, Intelligible Characters are seen as third categories that 
do not fit Schopenhauer’s general system and as an element that does not 
add much in explanation. As I intend to show, the overall problem with 
Intelligible Characters lies in their status as plural and individual while not 
being causally determined, rather than their belonging to the thing in itself. 
This renders the problem of their inclusion a categorical one in a rather 
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similar way to that of the doctrine of Ideas. Janaway’s concerns on Ideas 
and their difficult status translates to his further concerns about the doctrine 
of characters and the incoherence of its adoption and fit into the general 
system.  
In a similar way to the “third category objection”, I believe there are 
three main possible readings which could make sense of how Intelligible 
Characters take part of the world of the ‘in itself’: The first is that 
Intelligible Characters take part in the ‘in itself’, with ontological 
implications, by being located at a different category than objects of 
representation. If Schopenhauer makes a blunt distinction between the world 
as Will (the thing in itself) and representation, as Janaway and Magee in 
their critique to the doctrine of Ideas suggest, Intelligible Characters would 
take part of the world of the “in itself” while not being identified with the 
Will as the thing in itself. As Schopenhauer describes it, the thing in itself, 
not being subject to the spatio-temporal determinations and not holding the 
most basic representational form, i.e. being an object for a subject, is 
completely unknowable. In which case, Intelligible Character’s inclusion 
into the realm of the ‘in itself’ would represent a further difficulty for 
Schopenhauer. Assuming that both categories, the one of the ‘in itself’ and 
representation, are jointly exhaustive, that Intelligible Characters are part of 
the former would mean that they are not part of the world as representation, 
nor are they to be identified with the thing in itself. This means that, as a 
consequence, they would take part of a ‘third realm’ in which not only are 
they unable to be plural and individuated but also they cannot be 
represented as an object of knowledge. Following similar lines, another 
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possible reading of the issue could sustain that Intelligible Characters do 
belong to the world as representation but not in the same way that objects of 
perceptual experience do. Intelligible Characters would represent another 
piece of ontology in Schopenhauer’s system different from Ideas, objects of 
perceptual experience, and the ‘in itself’. A possibility for this reading 
originates from Schopenhauer’s own awareness on the double contradiction 
he would incur into by introducing Intelligible Characters as part of the ‘in 
itself’. I call this type of reading, in its two variations, an ontological 
reading. 
The second way I believe one can understand this is that Intelligible 
Characters represent an epistemological category and, as such, should be 
located at the level of the ‘in itself’ due to their independence from the 
necessary constraints for individuation, but that they would not constitute 
another piece of ontology in Schopenhauer’s account. For this to work, it is 
necessary to sustain how Intelligible Characters take part in the ‘in itself’, 
without them constituting an object of knowledge. Despite this, there is a 
variation of this reading, in which Intelligible Characters would represent 
another epistemological category different from representation, narrowly 
understood as objects of perceptual experience, and different from the thing 
in itself. Both these interpretations I call the epistemological reading. In the 
latter approach, that Intelligible Characters are part of the world ‘in itself’ 
could mean, that although they take part of the world as representation, due 
to their independence from the PSR, they differ from the kind of 
representation exemplified by objects of perceptual experience. The grounds 
for arguing for this type of reading are based on the difficulty that would 
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signify Schopenhauer’s contradiction on the independence of 
determinations of the thing in itself. As I showed in the previous chapter, 
Schopenhauer seems to establish a difference between the ‘thing in itself’ 
and representation based on the possibility of their knowledge. In this 
interpretation, Intelligible Characters would be part of the world as 
representation while differentiating themselves from objects of perceptual 
experience due to their independence from the PSR. They would be part of 
the ‘in itself’ as long as they do not take part in the set of objects of 
perceptual experiences. For this interpretation of the question to have any 
validity, the difficulty remains to show that Intelligible Characters take part 
in the most basic representational relation, viz. being an object for a subject.  
The last possibility I believe that exists for interpreting Intelligible 
Character’s belonging into the ‘in itself’ is the assertion that they represent 
both ontological and epistemological categories. I present this alternative as 
a concurrence of the first two, and its sustainability depends entirely on how 
strong the arguments are for one or the other. The way in which Janaway 
posed the problem of individuation leads me to believe that he opted for an 
ontological reading of the Intelligible Character’s belonging to the ‘in 
itself’. 
Since Intelligible Characters’ belonging to the ‘in itself’ is still open 
to different interpretations, the solution I intend to present to the problem of 
plurality and individuation will meet either a single or double challenge. 
The first step to answering the question lies in narrowing the scope of the 
problem. Independent of the fact that Janaway might not have been aware of 
this possible double difficulty, I believe his intuitions on the doctrine of 
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Ideas as a possible means for answering the problem could lead us to the 
right path.  In the next section, I intend to analyse the possible 
interpretations of the difficulty regarding Intelligible Characters. I present 
the arguments, based on Schopenhauer’s description of Intelligible 
Characters, for the impossibility of sustaining an ontological approach to 
their inclusion into the world of the ‘in itself’. I argue for a reading of 
Schopenhauer’s remarks on Intelligible Characters in which he assigns a 
similar role to the whole doctrine as the one he assigns to Ideas. One aim of 
the challenge that I address in the next section is the rejection of an 
interpretation in which Schopenhauer includes Intelligible Characters as an 
additional piece of ontology. I also argue for a reading where the problem of 
individuation posed by Janaway has to face the same problems as the 
doctrine of Ideas, for they have their roots in the difficulty of allocating 
causally-independent representational notions. The possibility of including 
Intelligible Characters as an extra piece of ontology has its parallel in the 
difficulties presented with the doctrine of Ideas. Hopefully, by the end of 
this chapter, the way in which I intend to answer both difficulties will be 
clearer. 
3.2 Intelligible Characters and the ‘In Itself’  
 
The meaning of Schopenhauer’s assertion that Intelligible 
Characters belong to the ‘in itself’, it seems to me, ought to be revised.  I 
believe Janaway’s assertions must be put to revision in the light of the 
distinction between the challenge of arguing for an account of, in 
Schopenhauer’s own terms, “transcendental diversity” (MR I p. 287) ,or, as 
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Janaway calls it, non-empirical individuation, and diversity at the level of 
the ‘in itself’. In order to give a proper answer to the problem, I dedicate 
this section to clarifying the issues at hand and determining whether one or 
two challenges have to be addressed. 
 As mentioned in the previous section there are two non-exclusive 
readings regarding the Intelligible Characters’ inclusion in the world of the 
‘in itself’. In the same vein as with the “third category objection” I believe 
there are strong reasons to reject an ontological reading of the doctrine of 
Intelligible Characters in any of its forms, for it would presuppose from the 
outset that Schopenhauer is willing to include more in his philosophy than 
he originally intended. As discussed in the previous chapter, there seems to 
be enough evidence in Schopenhauer’s writings to reject a double ontology 
(and, with much more reason, a triple) based on his reiterated assertions on 
the unity of the world. One of the main reasons for rejecting a reading of 
Ideas, for example, as constituting an extra piece of ontology lies in their 
status as objects of knowledge. As Schopenhauer put it, the only difference 
between the “thing in itself” (for Schopenhauer, the Will) and the Idea, is 
that the latter constitutes the ‘most immediate objectification’ of the former. 
In Ideas, Schopenhauer says, “it is the one and the same will that reveals 
itself, i.e. enters the form of representation, enters objectivity” (WW I p. 
143). The world, as presented by Schopenhauer, is not constituted by two or 
three types of things, but of one, the Will, that reveals itself into a 
multiplicity of Ideas, objects of perceptual experience and, I will argue, 
Intelligible Characters. In order to reject an ontological reading of the 
description of Intelligible Characters, I intend to argue that, as Janaway 
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rightly hints, there might be enough evidence, both implicit and explicit, in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy that allows us to draw a parallel with the 
doctrine of Ideas. Although a clearer view of Schopenhauer’s introduction 
of Intelligible Characters may result from this, one has to be careful in 
delimiting how this parallelism is to be drawn. In order to present a rejection 
of an ontological reading of Schopenhauer’s introduction of Intelligible 
Characters, I intend to show how they meet the conditions that allow us to 
argue that, in a similar way to Ideas, they also represent an objectification of 
the thing in itself. In other words, Intelligible Characters are the thing in 
itself while being objects of knowledge. As a consequence of this, one could 
say that in the same way that the Idea of a tree is present in every 
representation of a tree, every individual’s Intelligible Character is present 
in each one of the individual’s actions.  
 Keeping this in mind, I believe we can partially rely on Atwell’s 
comments on Ideas in their relation with Intelligible Characters. Atwell’s 
interpretation anticipates the kind of reading I intend to offer on both 
doctrines and their relation. In a similar way to Young, Atwell (1995) 
argues that: 
Schopenhauer introduces the Ideas, at least in The World as Will and 
Representation, for the very purpose that he introduces intelligible 
characters: to complete on the philosophical level that which is left 
incomplete on the scientific (or etiological) level of explanation. (p. 132) 
The origin of Atwell’s comments is found in Schopenhauer’s 
repeated assertions that seem to identify, with some obscurity attached to 
  
70 
them, the similarities in the roles of Ideas and Intelligible Characters. For 
example, Schopenhauer says that: 
the character of each individual man [Mensch], in so far as it is thoroughly 
individual and not entirely included in that of the species, can be regarded 
as a special Idea, corresponding to a particular act of objectification of the 
will. (WW I p. 158) 
Atwell (1995) continues by describing the similarity of the role of 
Ideas as being “the ‘third factors’ operative in all particular appearances and 
occurrences of the intuitive world, thus the ‘factors’ without which no 
natural change or human action can be adequately understood” (p. 133). 
This interpretation of the role of Intelligible Characters comes from the 
parallel with Ideas that Schopenhauer draws himself. Atwell’s interpretation 
of the role of Ideas as “third factors” is brought to light by the explanatory 
role Schopenhauer assigns them. As I presented in the previous chapter, 
Schopenhauer, by introducing the notion of universal and original natural 
forces, which “exhibit themselves as the lowest grades of the Will’s 
objectification”, presents Ideas as the philosophical explanation of nature 
overlooked by an etiological-scientific account (WW I p. 130). Following 
Atwell, the assignation of this role to Intelligible Characters comes from 
Schopenhauer’s own openness to the possibility that Ideas and Intelligible 
Characters represent the philosophical-level explanation for natural 
phenomena and human agency.  
The passages in which Schopenhauer draws the parallel between 
Ideas and Intelligible Characters are numerous. One example of this is 
included in a previously mentioned passage in which Schopenhauer calls 
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Intelligible Characters a “special Idea” (See the previous quote on this same 
page). Additionally, in §28 of The World as Will, where Schopenhauer says:  
the intelligible character coincides with the Idea, or more properly with the 
original act of will that reveals itself in the Idea. Therefore to this extent, 
not only the empirical character of every person, but also that of every 
animal species, nay, of every plant species, and even of every original 
force of inorganic nature, is to be regarded as a phenomenon or 
manifestation of an intelligible character […] (WW I p. 156)  
Although I believe this passage to be problematic as it leaves us wanting to 
know the difference between Ideas and Intelligible Characters (which is a 
problem that I will get on to in the next chapter), I also believe it draws an 
explicit but obscure parallel between the two doctrines. In addition to these, 
another important passage is found in §26 regarding the notion of natural 
forces which, as the reader would remember from the previous chapter, 
Schopenhauer explicitly identifies with Ideas (See section 2.3). On this, 
regarding these natural and original forces (as the causal phenomenon of the 
Idea), Schopenhauer writes: 
in themselves they are immediate phenomena of the will just as is the 
conduct of man; as such, they are groundless, just as is the character of a 
man. Their particular phenomena alone are subject to the principle of 
sufficient reason just as are the actions of men. On the other hand, they 
themselves can never be called either effect or cause, but are the prior and 
presupposed conditions of all causes and effects through which their own 
inner being is unfolded and revealed. (WW I p. 130)  
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This last remark provides us with important clues about Schopenhauer’s 
view of the role of Intelligible Characters that, in the same vein as Atwell, 
might lead us to reinforce the parallel between the two doctrines. There are 
two points I believe are worth mentioning.  
First, while considering the previous passages in which 
Schopenhauer discusses Ideas and Characters, is it worth noticing how he 
presents the distinction between Ideas and their phenomena as an analogy to 
the case of Intelligible Characters and human action. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Schopenhauer introduces the notion of original forces 
(Ideas) and their unfolding through natural laws in the phenomenal world as 
the result of spatio-temporal forms and causal determinations. These 
original forces constitute “the objectification of the will” (see Section 2.3) 
and their inner nature remains independent of causal and spatio-temporal 
determinations Thus they remain as a qualitates occultae inaccessible 
through aetiology. If we take gravity again as an example, Schopenhauer 
would agree that we get to know this original force through its spatio-
temporal unfolding whose regularity takes the form of a natural law. In a 
similar way, as Schopenhauer seems to suggest in the last passage, in the 
doctrine of Intelligible Characters a temporal unfolding and its temporal-
independent ground seem to confirm the main explanatory relation of 
human deeds. Human action is not different from the rest of the phenomenal 
experience insofar as it depends on spatio-temporal constraints. These 
actions, Schopenhauer remarks, are the “temporal unfolding” of the extra 
temporal Intelligible Character and thus the nature of human actions remain 
fixed (see Section 3.1). This fixed nature, Schopenhauer says:  
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is empirical only for our comprehension, but for this reason only as an 
appearance; on the other hand, what he may be in his essence in itself is 
called intelligible character. All of his actions, consistent with his external 
nature as determined by motives, can occur in no other way than in accord 
with this unchangeable individual character: as one is, so must one act. 
(BM pp. 185-186) 
 As mentioned, Schopenhauer’s account of Intelligible Characters 
was introduced from the necessity to find a locus for responsibility. If there 
is to be freedom in human deeds, said locus must be located outside the 
causal constraints of the phenomenal world. This locus is the Intelligible 
Character, that, as its equivalent in the original forces as Schopenhauer 
seems to suggest, is positioned as the ground from which all human deeds, 
independently from one another, unfold in a series of individuated spatio-
temporal actions. Bringing the example of gravity to the doctrine of 
characters, Schopenhauer’s remarks seem conducive to an interpretation 
that, as similarly occurs with gravity (as an original force) and the 
innumerable instances in which we see it act in perceptual representation, so 
is the case of the intelligible character of each person and the multiplicity of 
individual actions that unfold within the causal chain of events.   
 If Schopenhauer’s previous remarks were not enough to argue for 
the similarities between Ideas and Intelligible Characters, three sections 
later he says regarding natural forces (or Ideas):  
just as the material cause contains merely the determination that at such a 
time, in such a place, and in such a matter, a manifestation of this or that 
natural force must take place, so also the motive determines only the act of 
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will of a knowing being, at such a time, in such a place, and in such and 
such circumstances, as something quite individual; it by no means 
determines that that being wills in general and wills in this way. That is the 
expression of his intelligible character […] (WW I p. 163) 
This parallel is the one employed by Atwell in his attempt to identify 
Ideas and Intelligible Characters in their explanatory role as “third factors”. 
In the same way that Ideas, or original forces, are presented as “third 
factors” or qualitates occultae which go beyond a scientific and therefore 
aetiological explanation of nature, Intelligible Characters, as Schopenhauer 
would suggest from his remarks on both doctrines, stand as the “third 
factor”. Without this “third factor”, human action cannot be ultimately 
explained for it is there where the “free” (independent from any of the roots 
of the PSR) ground for actions is found. 
If Intelligible Characters are the temporal-independent ground of 
human action (from which the parallel with Ideas is drawn) then it could be 
sustained that, similarly to Ideas, they correspond to an objectification of the 
thing in itself which would make of them objects of knowledge. This is why 
the second point regarding the relation between Ideas and Characters relates 
to an often unattended passage (unattended to also by Atwell) in §45, about 
the possibility of knowledge of the character. There, Schopenhauer presents 
a rather different use of the term ‘character’ than the one I presented 
concerning his previous remarks, but there are reasons to believe he is 
indeed still talking about Intelligible Characters. Schopenhauer says: 
[…] it is one of the distinguishing features of mankind that therein the 
character of the species and that of the individual are separated so that, as 
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was said in the previous book, each person exhibits to a certain extent an 
Idea that is wholly characteristic of him. Therefore the arts, aiming at a 
presentation of the Idea of mankind, have as their problem both beauty as 
the character of the species, and the character of the individual, which is 
called character par excellence. Again, they have this only in so far as this 
character is to be regarded not as something accidental and quite peculiar 
to the man as a single individual, but as a side of the Idea of mankind, 
specially appearing in this particular individual; and thus the presentation 
of this individual serves to reveal the Idea. Therefore the character, 
although individual as such, must be comprehended and expressed ideally. 
(WW I pp. 224-225)  
 In the light of the previous passages, these last remarks would strike 
any reader as confusing, especially considering that this is the only use of 
the term ‘character par excellence’ when referring to the particular character 
of a given individual. The use of new terminology for referring to an 
individual character could lead one to think that this ‘character par 
excellence’ might not be our Intelligible Character. Nevertheless, these 
remarks appear in the third book of The World as Will, which means that, 
when considering the previous remarks on the individuality of characters, 
Schopenhauer is mentioning precisely the passages I presented above from 
the second book of his main work where the notion of Intelligible 
Characters is first introduced. With this in mind, I believe it is licit to 
consider that Schopenhauer makes use of different terminology when 
referring to either empirical or Intelligible Characters. In fact, 
Schopenhauer’s use of the isolated term ‘character’ is to be found 
throughout the whole of his work, meaning that his commitment to a strict 
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use of terms could be prone to variation.14 Although this particular use of 
the term ‘character par excellence’ is unique in The World as Will, I do not 
believe that the range of possibilities for the meaning of the term is 
limitless. He has previously mentioned both empirical and Intelligible 
Characters as one being the temporal unfolding of the other. This suggests 
that Schopenhauer sees characters at two different levels, i.e. at a causal-
temporal level, and at a causally-independent level. The possibility that 
through these remarks he is making reference to an empirical character must 
be rejected. To ‘express a character ideally’, if we are to understand Ideas in 
a rather Platonic sense and follow the direct and explicit mentions of both 
doctrines as Schopenhauer seemed to intend, these are to be portrayed as a 
universal characteristic that gets exemplified in a diversity of ways in the 
causal and temporal chain of events. Returning to the parallelism drawn 
above, Schopenhauer’s mention of a character being portrayed ‘ideally’ fits 
the description of the causally-independent Intelligible Character.  
3.3 Characters as Objects of Knowledge 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Schopenhauer centres aesthetic 
experience on the knowledge of Ideas. The task of the genius, or the artist, 
is to present and express an Idea. As Schopenhauer suggests in the most 
recently mentioned passage, in order to do this, the artist must comprehend 
and express such character in a way that allows him to access the particular 
Idea, which in this case, is the Idea of mankind. If in arts Ideas could be 
reached by comprehending and expressing characters, I believe that in the 
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previous passage Schopenhauer is implicitly advocating for the possibility 
of characters as objects of knowledge. This could be supported by 
Schopenhauer’s repeated remarks on the importance of drama as one of the 
highest forms of artistic portrayal. In drama, Schopenhauer says, “the end, 
the revelation of the Idea of mankind, is attained especially by two means, 
namely by a true and profound presentation of significant characters, and by 
the invention of pregnant situations in which they disclose themselves” 
(WW I p. 251). Through drama, Schopenhauer continues, the artist not only 
presents the 
significant characters as truly and faithfully as does nature itself but, so 
that we might get to know them, he must place them in those situations in 
which their peculiar qualities are completely unfolded, and in which they 
are presented distinctly in sharp outline […] (WW I p. 251) 
From this perspective, I believe one can follow Thomas Stern’s 
(2014) comments on the importance and significance of drama in exploring 
human relations through the presentation of characters. Stern presents 
Schopenhauer’s thoughts on the importance of drama as means for the 
portrayal of diverse human characters in a clear and succinct manner. In a 
way, I take this to be important, for it presents the artist’s role in sharing and 
presenting these characters to the audience. In other words, Stern describes 
in drama the ultimate role of the artist for Schopenhauer. Stern (2014) 
focuses our attention on the importance of Shakespeare to Schopenhauer for 
his exceptional ability in character portrayal (p. 63). Stern also draws our 
attention to one of Schopenhauer’s passages where he claims, when 
discussing how unalterable character is, that “Shakespeare's dramas, as a 
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rule, afford us the best illustration of the truth in question” (PP II p. 232). 
While discussing Schopenhauer’s account of the fixed Intelligible 
Character, Stern (2014) remarks that “drama is the form par excellence for 
exploring human relations in the context of dramatic characters whose 
‘characters’ are unchanging” (p. 63). The artist, in need of portraying the 
Idea of mankind, presents human characters through fictional situations in 
which their unalterable traits unfold. If one considers the parallelism 
between Ideas and characters presented above, for which I believe there is 
enough evidence to sustain it, and if Intelligible Characters are to be 
considered as a ‘quasi-Idea’, then the only relevant characteristic that they 
should express is the one of being objects of knowledge. Although aesthetic 
experience concerns the presentation of the Idea, through character 
portrayal, Shakespearean drama offers the opportunity for reflection on the 
individual’s correspondence to the Idea of mankind and its individual 
character (Stern, 2014). The artist, it seems, ought to be acquainted (in a 
loose way) with both the Idea and Character in order to portray it accurately.  
 In order to sustain this, one has to be careful in defining what sense 
are we giving to the artistic acquaintance with character. While I agree with 
Stern’s (2014) remarks on the impossibility of drama to offer direct access 
to Intelligible Characters, I still believe there is more to understand from the 
artist’s side. Dramatic characters, as fictional creations which are put in 
created situations with the aim of showing the unfolding of a particular kind 
of character through individual actions, “have no corresponding intelligible 
character beyond space and time for us to access through aesthetic 
experience” (Stern, 2014, p. 64). Nevertheless, in a similar way that the 
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artist must have knowledge of the Idea of mankind in order to present it 
through drama, the portrayal of unchanging characters, although represented 
fictionally, should require some kind knowledge on the part of the artist. On 
stage, Stern (2014) suggests, dramatic characters, through a series of 
individual actions which constitute the empirical characters depicted, 
portray the ‘essential’ features that are consistent with one type of character. 
I would add that for this to be possible, in addition to the knowledge of the 
Idea from the artist’s side, she must also have knowledge of the different 
characters beyond their empirical unfolding in order to portray their 
inalterability. Through watching drama, we do not have access to 
Intelligible Characters as the fixed counterpart of the empirical. The artist, 
on the other hand, must have knowledge of it in order to create a 
fictionalised unfolding of character. In other words, the artist must have 
knowledge of the timeless and unalterable character she intends to portray 
through the actions of the dramatic characters on stage, paralleled with the 
way in which she needs to have some knowledge of the Idea of mankind 
when trying to portray it through her artistic work. Thus, in the same way 
that the artist is to present through her work the Idea of mankind from her 
own knowledge of it, it seems that the only coherent way to portray the 
inalterability of characters must derive from a similar kind of knowledge. 
This takes the parallel between both doctrines even further while it also 
coheres with Schopenhauer’s view of the importance of drama as an artistic 
portrayal. This suggests that, in spite of the fact that aesthetic experience is 
concerned with the presentation of the Idea, in virtue of this task, the artist, 
or the genius who has access to such Idea could (or maybe even must) also 
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have access to the unalterable causal-independent character that she also 
portrays.  
  Although I intend to develop an organic reading of Ideas and 
Intelligible Characters in more detail in the next chapter, for now, there 
seems to be a clear basis for sustaining that Schopenhauer, not just at the 
level of mere analogy, saw a parallelism between the two doctrines. As the 
main task of this section is to reject an ontological reading of the doctrine of 
Intelligible Characters in any of its forms, I believe we are now in place to 
argue for such a rejection in the light of the explicit similarity between the 
roles assigned to the two doctrines.  
 
 Considering what has been thus far revealed, I believe there is 
enough evidence to accept Atwell’s remarks on the role and interpretation of 
both Ideas and Intelligible Characters. In addition to both being ‘third 
factors’ in the explanation of nature and human action, Schopenhauer’s 
explicit mention of both doctrines is favorable for a belief that, Atwell says 
further, the ontological status of one could also correspond to the other. It is 
important to bear in mind that Atwell’s use of the term ‘ontological status’ 
is not committed to what I portrayed as being an “ontological reading” of 
the doctrine. He notes, on the basis of what has been discussed, that 
whatever ontological status we assign to either Ideas or Intelligible 
Characters, that is, to the question about the reality of Ideas and Characters, 
there is enough in Schopenhauer’s use of both doctrines to argue that such 
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status is the same for both (Atwell, 1995, p. 133). While asking about the 
ontological status of Ideas, Atwell (1995) remarks that the question:  
’Are Ideas real?’ has on one score the same meaning that ‘Are human 
characters real?’ And if the answer to the latter question is yes, then so is 
the answer to the former question – in the same sense and for the same 
reason. (p. 134)  
These ‘reasons’, Atwell implies, are found in the role Schopenhauer 
assigned to both doctrines. In my opinion, I believe we can go further to 
present the explicit parallel between the doctrines Schopenhauer uses as 
evidence for this “ontological analogy”. 
Since the reading of an ontological interpretation of Ideas was 
rejected, I believe the same should be the case for Intelligible Characters. As 
with Ideas, there simply is not enough evidence in Schopenhauer to believe 
that Intelligible Characters would correspond to an extra piece of ontology. 
Therefore, Janaway’s interpretation of the doctrine of Intelligible Characters 
and consequently his way of presenting the problem of plurality and 
individuation, through Schopenhauer’s reference to their belonging to the 
‘in itself’, find a better explanation through what I have called an 
“epistemological reading”. This means that the Intelligible Character’s 
belonging to the realm of the ‘in itself’ can be interpreted as an 
“epistemological category”, comparable to the case of the doctrine of Ideas. 
Nevertheless, such a reading still presents some difficulties on its own. If we 
are to accept an epistemological reading of the assertion that Intelligible 
Character’s belong to the ‘in itself’, we still have to deal with 
Schopenhauer’s repeated assertions that deny the possibility that the ‘in 
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itself’ is an object of knowledge. As a consequence, this would leave us 
with the contradictory assertion that Intelligible Characters, being part of the 
‘in itself’, could not be objects of knowledge in which case all parallelism 
with Ideas ought to be rejected from the outset. I believe that such a blunt 
contradiction, in the light of Schopenhauer’s repeated remarks 
characterising both doctrines, could lead to a better interpretation of 
Schopenhauer’s description of the doctrine of Intelligible Characters and 
regard them as an epistemological category equivalent to one of the Ideas, 
i.e. as objects of knowledge, and therefore objects of representation, 
independent of the causal determinations that determine our knowledge of 
the objects of perceptual experience. There is enough evidence, especially in 
the second and third books of The World as Will, to sustain that the place 
Intelligible Characters have in Schopenhauer’s system is closer to the one of 
Ideas instead of being isolated from the rest of the elements within it. For 
this reason, in order to give an answer to the problem of individuation, I 
believe one is in a position to refer to the doctrine of Ideas as another 
instantiation of the problem of transcendental diversity. If the question 
about the possibility of individuation and plurality regarding the doctrine of 
characters represents an utter contradiction on Schopenhauer’s part, then the 
same contradiction ought to be exposed regarding the doctrine of Ideas.  
Thus far I have shown the similarities in both doctrines and how the 
problem of individuation and plurality in the doctrine of Intelligible 
Characters relates to the original worries regarding Ideas as a third category, 
supposedly being located somewhere between objects of perceptual 
experience and the thing in itself. From that perspective, in the next chapter, 
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I intend to resolve, for both doctrines, the difficulties concerning their 
individuation and plurality. As I have been mentioning, this follows 
Atwell’s interpretation in reading both Ideas and Intelligible Characters as 
‘third factors’ without which human agency and natural changes can not be 
understood. At the same time, I intend to answer an immediate question that 
arises from such interpretations regarding the difference in the roles played 
by one and the other. My answer, while addressing the difficulties of 
individuation and plurality, it is also meant to present a blunt difference in 
the kind of role that both elements play in their interpretation as ‘third 
factors’. This leaves us not just with the single problem of explaining 
plurality outside spatio-temporal determinations for both doctrines, but also 
with the need for explanation of what differentiates one doctrine from the 
other. I intend to solve the problem for both doctrines through 
Schopenhauer’s understanding of efficient and final causes. Hopefully, this 
will provide clearer insight into the organic unity found in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy and also a clearer understanding of Schopenhauer’s own 
comments on what the essence of his philosophy is. At the same time, it will 
help us differentiate between the roles of each doctrine. Before embarking 
on that task, though, I would like to highlight Schopenhauer’s comments on 
character when referring to natural kinds, the purpose of which is to close 
the gap that might exist between their role in explaining nature and the role 
assigned to Ideas.  
3.4 Characters of Natural Kinds 
 
In this final section, I would like to draw attention to some of 
Schopenhauer’s own remarks on the doctrine of characters that, it seems to 
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me, might give us some insight on how to better understand Intelligible 
Characters in their role as “third explanatory factors”. The importance of 
this section lies in that it serves, along with all that has been said thus far, as 
an introduction to my interpretation of the difference in the roles of Ideas 
and Characters in explaining perceptual phenomena. Thus, the aim of this 
section is to show that there are reasons to believe that the intention of such 
passages could be understood as extending beyond mere analogy in that 
they give us a clearer understanding of the doctrine of characters by 
widening the use of the term to other instances and not reducing it to the 
topic of human agency. Characters, I argue, in the same vein as Ideas, can 
be understood as a sort of qualitas occulta that ultimately serve as a grounds 
for perceptual phenomena. 
Thomas Stern (2014) makes mention of Schopenhauer’s comments 
on characters of natural kinds while discussing the fixity of character and its 
expression through different circumstances in drama (p. 63). Through 
(Shakespearean) drama, Stern argues, highlighting the importance of this art 
form to Schopenhauer, the fixed character of the dramatic character is 
presented to the audience through a series of diverse actions that express the 
character in different ways. The development of the dramatic character 
throughout the play, as Stern presents it, accords with Schopenhauer’s thesis 
that human actions unfold differently due to changes in circumstances, but 
always express the same fixed character. When referring to a critique of 
Schopenhauer’s view that states that his view on characters would not make 




underestimate the subtlety of Schopenhauer’s view with its emphasis on 
revealing character under different circumstances […] as the circumstances 
change, so do the kinds of things that people do – but this is merely their 
(fixed) character expressing itself in different ways. To borrow one of his 
analogies, it might help to think about the ‘character’ of water. (p. 63) 
Thus, Stern makes use of Schopenhauer’s mention of the ‘character of 
water’ as an analogy for explaining how the same and fixed character is to 
be expressed through a variety of different actions in a diversity of 
circumstances.  
While talking about how fixed is the character of each individual, 
Schopenhauer says: 
The way in which the character discloses its qualities can be fully 
compared with the way in which every body in nature-without-knowledge 
reveals its qualities. Water remains water with the qualities inherent in it. 
But whether as a calm lake it reflects its banks or dashes in foam over 
rock, or by artificial means spouts into the air in a tall jet, all this depends 
on external causes; the one is as natural to it as is the other. But it will 
always show one or the other according to the circumstances; it is equally 
ready for all, yet in every case, it is true to its character […] So also will 
every human character reveals itself under all circumstances, but the 
phenomena proceeding from it will be in accordance with the 
circumstances. (WW I p. 139) 
 I believe Schopenhauer’s mention of characters regarding natural 
kinds could prove to be insightful in the light of Atwell’s interpretation of 
the doctrines of Ideas and characters in their explanatory role in 
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understanding nature and human agency. As a consequence, I also believe 
that Schopenhauer’s mention of characters outside the discussion of human 
agency opens the door for an expansion of the role of characters in 
explaining some features of perceptual phenomena. Thus, these comments 
ought not to be treated necessarily as constituting mere analogies designed 
for us to understand the human character. Let us see now how this is so.  
There are  two primary reasons for sustaining the relevance of these 
comments on character. The first is more circumstantial. Schopenhauer’s 
repeated mention of what I will call the ‘character of natural kinds’, which 
is found in more passages than just the previous, leads me to believe that the 
introduction of characters (understood as timeless Intelligible Characters) is 
not to be reduced to an understanding of human agency, but to nature in 
general, to which we, as individuals, also belong. As I intend to show, there 
are different instances in which Schopenhauer makes explicit mention of 
character both when referring to diverse natural kinds and when talking 
about different animal species. In a section titled “On the Objectification of 
the Will in Nature without Knowledge” of the second book of his primary 
work, Schopenhauer makes some similar remarks to those just shown. He 
says:  
hydraulics can be conceived as a description of the character of water, in 
that it states for us the manifestations of will to which water is moved by 
gravity. These always correspond exactly to the external influences, for in 
the case of all non-individual modes of existence, no particular character 
exists along with the general one; thus they can easily be referred to fixed 
fundamental characteristics, which we call laws, and learn by observing 
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the experience of water. These laws state exactly how water will behave in 
different circumstances of every kind […] (WW II p. 297) 
What Schopenhauer refers to as the ‘character of water’ seems to 
have its importance in that it reflects the behaviour of that element under 
different external circumstances within the world of perceptual experience. 
Here Schopenhauer talks about the ‘fixed fundamental characteristics’, very 
much like the way in which he portrays the fixed human character as the 
diversity of the observable behaviour of natural kinds that unfold in 
perceptual experience due to ‘external influences’. As expressed in the 
previous quote, similar to human behaviour, organic nature can also be 
described as having a character. Water, for example, ‘is true to its character’ 
either by adopting the form of a stream or remaining still while contained. 
All the possible ways in which water “behaves” are contained in its 
character that, contrasted with the case of individuals, remains fixed and the 
same for the whole kind. A similar account is given by Schopenhauer when 
he talks about the character of the species in contrast to the individual 
character of every human being. Schopenhauer says that “animals have only 
the character of the species, not an individual character. But in the 
manifestation of man, the character of the species is separated from the 
character of the individual” (WW I p. 220). In organic nature, and not only 
in human agency, there seems to be a character, i.e. fixed characteristics that 
unfold in experience with the constancy and consistency of a law. Under 
external circumstances, the way in which any of the natural kinds behaves, 
or even every human being, is the perceptual unfolding of the fixed 
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character that serves as a ‘ground’ for the variety of behaviours seen in 
experience. 
This leads us to the second and most important reason why such 
comments on character are particularly relevant: In a similar way that 
Intelligible Characters appear as the ultimate ground for the unfolding of 
human agency, they could also be presented as a sort of qualitas occulta for 
the explanation of the representational manifestation of species and natural 
kinds. Let us remember that characters, as they are presented in the 
explanation of human agency, are meant to account for the notion that we 
act on our own will, i.e. that we are the doers of our deeds. The 
interpretation of characters as qualitates occultae can be ascertained from 
Schopenhauer’s own comments on the matter. He says: 
Spinoza (Epist. 62) says that if a stone projected through the air had 
consciousness, it would imagine it was flying of its own will. I add merely 
that the stone would be right. The impulse is for it what the motive is for 
me, and what in the case of the stone appears as cohesion, gravitation, 
rigidity in the assumed condition, is by its inner nature the same as what I 
recognise in myself as will […] In the case of man, this is called character; 
in the case of the stone, it is called quality; but it is the same in both. (WW 
I p. 126) 
Schopenhauer’s recognition of the shared inner nature of what we 
found in ourselves through the exercise of agency and the stone’s behaviour 
under external influences, does not reduce the assignation of characters to 
human beings in the discussion of agency. Although here Schopenhauer 
calls ‘quality’ to that which serves as a ground for the stone to behave in a 
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law-like manner under the influence of external circumstances, we have 
seen in previous quotes that at times he openly talks about the character of 
natural kinds. Similarly, as it occurs with his use of the terms ‘character’ 
and ‘intelligible character’, I believe we should be open to recognising that 
at times Schopenhauer is not committed to a single use of terminology as he 
bluntly ignores continuity in his use of nomenclature. Thus, if we are to 
understand Schopenhauer’s use of Intelligible Characters as the locus of 
responsibility, in the way in which all human actions follow the fixed and 
timeless character, then we ought to recognise that this is also the case for 
the rest of organic nature. I believe this gives a wider scope to the adoption 
of the doctrine of characters than what is commonly ascribed to it. If we 
consider the doctrine of Characters in its parallelism with the doctrine of 
Ideas and follow Atwell’s interpretation of both as “third explanatory 
factors”, then the former doctrine is bound to have a shockingly similar role 
to the latter in our understanding of nature. As we only know an individual’s 
character through the unfolding of her actions in perceptual experience, so 
we also know the character of natural kinds or species through their 
behaviour. This being so if the intelligible character of each individual 
remains as a “third factor”, or a qualitas occulta, without which no 
explanation of human agency is ever complete, then the same occurs with 
the behaviour of organic nature in general. As Ideas are, Intelligible 
Characters are the qualitates occultae without which an explanation of 
nature, in general, is never complete, for they are the ultimate explanatory 
devices for behaviour under external circumstances. 
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At this point, an obvious question arises: if Ideas and Characters are 
to give an explanation of nature in general as “third factors”, what is it that 
differentiates one from the other? I intend to provide the answer to this 
question in the next chapter. This is related to Schopenhauer’s 



















The Integration of the Doctrines of Ideas and Character 
 
4.1 Efficient and Final Causes: The First Root of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present how the doctrines of Ideas and 
Characters are integrated into the whole of Schopenhauer’s system. This is 
done by means of presenting their role in the explanation of nature through 
efficient and final causes. The doctrines of Ideas and Characters, I argue, 
come to fill an incomplete view of the world as portrayed in the Fourfold 
Root. 
In order to present the full extent of the roles played by Ideas and 
Characters there are two forms of the PSR that will occupy our attention. 
We will concentrate on these two forms because they focus specifically on 
the kinds of representational objects that we have been discussing 
throughout the presentation of the doctrines of Ideas and characters, i.e. 
objects of perceptual experience and human actions. Although 
Schopenhauer dedicates the whole of the Fourfold Root to present all the 
forms of the PSR, he still does not make explicit how the explanation of 
organic and inorganic nature is to be achieved by either efficient or final 
causes. This is where the second volume of The World as Will becomes 
useful. My intention in this section is to show explicitly what this link, 
between the first form of the PSR and an explanation of organic and 
inorganic nature, looks like. As I explained in the first chapter, I follow 
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White’s thesis on the importance of the Fourfold Root as the foundation of 
Schopenhauer’s system (see Section 1.1). 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the first class of objects 
that occupy Schopenhauer’s attention in describing the first form of the PSR 
is the one of “intuitive, complete, empirical representations” (FR p. 33, 
emphasis in original). Therefore, the first form of the PSR concerns the 
connectedness between objects of perceptual experience. The form of this 
principle, Schopenhauer says, is as follows: “If a state of one or more real 
objects appear, then there must be another previous state, from which the 
new one follows according to a rule, i.e. as often as the first exists, every 
time” (FR p. 38, emphasis added). This, Schopenhauer continues: 
exclusively refers to alterations of material states and to absolutely nothing 
else […] It is the regulation of outer experience appearing in time, but 
these are altogether material. Any alteration can only occur when another, 
determined according to a rule, has preceded it, but through which, then, it 
occurs as necessarily brought about. (FR p. 40, emphasis in original)  
This form of the principle, then, while applying exclusively to 
objects of perceptual experience, states that the necessary relations that take 
place between one and another state of matter is the one of causality, in the 
form of one state of matter always being preceded by another. In order to 
find the cause of a particular state, one has to look back on the order of 
previous states to find the one from which the actual state of matter derives 
its necessity and came to be. What matters to us is the scope of the account 
he adopts when presenting this form of the principle and to what extent we 
can expect these relations to give us knowledge of the natural world. This is 
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the reason why Schopenhauer’s account of objects of empirical reality, the 
core of which gives name to this form of the PSR, results insightful in our 
understanding of the necessity to introduce the doctrine of Ideas as an 
explanatory complement to the understanding of nature through efficient 
causes.  
For Schopenhauer, the faculty of understanding unifies time and 
space and applies its form, causality (see Section 1.1). As I have mentioned, 
causality refers only to alterations of material states and therein lies the key 
to understand what this form of the principle is really about. Schopenhauer, 
when referring to matter as what remains when we “strip” everyday objects 
of its form and specific qualities, makes the following remarks:  
those forms and qualities that we have eliminated are nothing other than 
the particular and specially determined way of acting of bodies, which 
constitutes their difference as such. Therefore, if we disregard the forms 
and qualities of objects, then what remains is only activity in general, pure 
acting as such, causality itself (considered objectively) – that is, what 
remains is only the reflection of our own understanding, the image of its 
only function projected outward, and matter is pure causality through and 
through: its being is its action in general. (FR p. 80) 
 The key characteristic of the form of the PSR of becoming is that its 
type of objects, i.e. objects of perceptual experience, are in a state of 
constant change, which is a product of their interaction with each other. 
Objects of experience, ultimately understood as always-changing states of 
matter, have activity (change) as their essential characteristic. The first form 
of the PSR acts, therefore, upon the whole range of objects of perceptual 
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experience, from inorganic to organic objects. As a consequence of this, 
although Schopenhauer presents causality and all of its forms as acting on 
the same kind of phenomena, he establishes an explanatory difference 
between them, rooted in the further distinction among objects of perceptual 
experience. Causality, Schopenhauer would say, acts over objects of 
experience in different ways. This distinction, Schopenhauer says, lies in 
that “the greater the receptivity, the more subtle the mode of influence can 
be” (FR p. 49). In an arbitrary way, Schopenhauer makes a distinction 
between inorganic (or lifeless) and organic objects regarding the type of 
causal relations that govern them. Among the latter, he also distinguishes 
between plants and animals as being acted upon differently by causality. 
Thus, as a consequence of the distinction among bodies of experience, 
Schopenhauer says, “the causality which directs all alterations likewise is of 
three forms, namely as cause, in the narrowest sense of the word, or as 
stimulus, or as motivation […]” (FR p. 57).  
The first form of the PSR extends to all objects of perceptual 
experience, but it does not act over all of them equally. In its three different 
forms, cause in the narrowest sense, stimulus, and motive, Schopenhauer 
says causality helps us explain and understand nature through the 
knowledge of the relations between perceptual objects. Cause in the 
narrowest sense, or as Schopenhauer calls it in The World as Will, efficient 
cause, “is the one according to which all alterations in the inorganic 
kingdom result” (FR p. 48). In On the Freedom of the Will, he describes it 
as “that by means of which all mechanical, physical, and chemical 
alterations of the objects of experience occur” (FW p. 57). It is the type of 
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causality that, for example, tells us that for the formation of H₂O, one 
oxygen and two hydrogen atoms are present and connected by covalent 
bonds. Interestingly, Schopenhauer saw in efficient causes an explanation 
for the changes and alterations of thoughtless matter. Through efficient 
cause, science is able to explain the formation of inorganic nature and thus 
provide us with insight into the way nature works.  
In remarks reminiscent of what has been presented in the section of 
Ideas, Schopenhauer admits the incapacity of efficient causes to give us a 
complete account of nature. He says:  
all efficient causes from which everything is explained always rest on 
something wholly inexplicable, that is, on the original qualities of things 
and the natural forces that make their appearance in them. By virtue of 
such forces they produce a definite effect […] (WW II p. 173) 
Efficient causes, then, although they give us knowledge of the causal 
nexus between one state of matter and the one that follows from it (mostly 
for inorganic nature), fall short in explaining why such relations take place 
as a necessity. Schopenhauer, in a rather explicit remark on the extension of 
this form of the principle, says:  
The endless chain of causes and effects produces all alterations, yet it 
never extends beyond these, so two things remain untouched. These are, on 
the one hand, matter […] and, on the other hand, the original forces of 
nature, because these forces are the means by which alterations or effects 
are possible at all- the means by which causes first receive causality. (FR 
p. 47).  
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Although insightful, efficient causes fall short in providing what for 
Schopenhauer would be a “complete explanation” of nature. Bounded by its 
same principles, efficient causes can only give an account of the 
connectedness between objects of perceptual experience, leaving out in its 
explanation the original forces that make all the causal connections possible 
from the outset. In order to give a complete explanation of phenomena, 
Schopenhauer is in need of an element that helps him give an account of 
these original forces. 
In spite of the fact that this comment refers directly to the first form 
of the principle, I do not believe it necessary to reduce its truth to only 
efficient causes. Regardless of the form of causality, as Schopenhauer 
would say, it is true that neither, in the endless chain of alterations of states 
of matter, can go beyond objects of perceptual experience, for these 
exclusively constitute its objects. Causality, as the first form of the PSR, 
only applies to objects of representation and, therefore, in any of its forms, it 
cannot go beyond the type of object it refers to. I do not believe there is any 
further reason to reduce such inability of acting beyond its type of objects 
exclusively to any of the particular forms of causality. Hence, I believe it is 
reasonable to say that since this inability applies to causality in its entirety, 
by consequence, it also applies to all its forms. In other words, causality is 
bound to give us an insight into the world at a representational level, 
specifically about objects of perceptual experience, either of organic or 
inorganic nature, but it can go no further.  
Similarly, as it occurs with the first form of causality, I believe that 
it is licit to say that due to the inability of efficient causes to give a complete 
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account of nature, and due to the fact that it is just one of the forms of 
causality, hence derived from the same principle as the rest of its forms and 
applicable to the same object, we could admit that such inability also applies 
to causality in the form of motives. I intend to show that this limitation,, 
although not expressed by Schopenhauer, has its explanatory counterpart in 
the fourth form of the PSR and its object. 
 Schopenhauer describes this type of causality for the first time in 
the Fourfold Root. There, he remarks that it “directs animal life proper, thus 
their doings, i.e. the external actions consciously performed by all animal 
beings” (FR p. 48), thus being the causal explanation of the latter. A motive, 
Schopenhauer adds further, “is a cause and operates with the necessity that 
all causality entails” (FR p. 50) and is expressed in that all animals, through 
cognition, move towards an aim and end (FR p. 49). In general terms, 
Schopenhauer considers this type of causality as that from which all animal 
and human action is performed. If we take as an example the behaviour of 
any animal, one would find, according to Schopenhauer, that the most 
immediate cause of the actions arising from such behaviour lies in the 
motive or end that motivated the animal to perform it. Now, if we apply this 
to a particular case, a motive that may constitute a causal explanation of the 
barking of a dog is the dog’s unconscious “willingness” to defend its 
territory and frighten a possible threat. This type of causality, as described 
here, is also named by Schopenhauer in The World as Will as final causes, 
i.e. a teleological explanation. 
It is interesting that Schopenhauer, in The World as Will, expands 
his understanding of the way the final causes are explicative of nature. The 
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remarks about causality presented on the Fourfold Root, although 
thoroughly presented, are better understood in the light of his account on the 
topic as it appears in his prime work. There, he presents an account of 
causality, and the forms it takes, that follows more closely and expressly an 
Aristotelian one. Schopenhauer says:  
The efficient cause is that by which a thing is; the final cause is that on 
account of which a thing is. The Phenomenon to be explained has in time 
the former behind it and the latter before it. Merely in the case of the 
arbitrary actions of animal beings do the two directly coincide, since in 
them the final cause, the end or aim, appear as a motive. (WW II p. 331, 
emphasis in original)  
This way of presenting both forms of causality is crucial for 
understanding their explanatory power. In Fourfold Root, Schopenhauer 
makes explicit the fact that causality applies exclusively to the first class of 
objects of representation, while at the same time he explicitly leads the 
reader to the recognition that the law of causality is the product of the 
application of the understanding which gives unity to the otherwise 
separated forms of time and space. These remarks have their basis in 
Schopenhauer’s view on the first form of the PSR and the unity of objects of 
experience that, as mentioned, is only achieved through the application of 
causality. Nature, Schopenhauer says, “achieves without reflection, and 
without a conception of an end, that which appears so appropriate and so 
deliberate” [Emphasis added] (WW II p. 327). The suitability of teleology, 
or the explanation of phenomena through final causes, for giving an account 
of a blind and thoughtlessly organized nature lies in that it implies the 
assumption, brought by the subject, “of the suitability of every part” (WW II 
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p. 329) that constitutes nature as a whole. Thus, every entity that constitutes 
either organic or inorganic nature, due to its dependence on these forms of 
intellect, finds itself to be related to another and is in principle able to be 
explained by any of the three forms of causality. We find in human beings, 
for example, the suitability of all three forms of causality as explanatory. 
We could explain the formation of our bodies through efficient causes, the 
reaction of our bodies through stimuli, and our performed actions through 
final causes, i.e. via motives. The fact that we see in ourselves causality in 
all three forms does not imply, Schopenhauer would say, that we are in 
possession of any special characteristic, but, with more or less sense, the 
whole of nature is able to be explained in more than just one of these forms. 
Hence, Schopenhauer refers to the difference of two forms of causality by 
saying that “final causes (causae finales) are the clue to the understanding 
of organic nature, just as efficient causes (causae efficientes) are to that of 
inorganic nature” (WW II p. 329, emphasis added). From an 
epistemological perspective, objects of perceptual experience are to be 
understood and explained, with more or less coherence, by these forms of 
causality. We can explain the origin of our actions through motives, the 
process of healing through stimuli, and the formation of our bodies through 
efficient causes.   
Interestingly enough, some of the examples that Schopenhauer 
presents while discussing final causes as explicative of organic nature help 
us understand, although indirectly, a complete account of nature as a whole. 
In section XXVI of the second volume of The World as Will, Schopenhauer 
exemplifies this by calling the nest of the termites the “motive” for the 
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toothless jaw of the anteater, or the hard egg-shell that the chicken breaks 
when it is born a “motive” for its pointy beak (WW II p. 332). I believe the 
that Schopenhauer expects the reader to understand this along similar lines 
of what he presented as efficient causes. Being a priori, causality explains 
the relation between objects of experience, and in the case of certain kind of 
relations, they are explained by the influence of one object over another, 
given as a motive. A way of understanding this, Schopenhauer remarks, is 
that “all movements that the animal as animal performs […] occur in 
consequence of a cognized object, thus on motives”, and therefore, he 
concludes, “an animal is any body whose characteristic external movements 
and alterations, in accordance with its nature, always follow from motives” 
(FW pp. 59-60). This explains, in the form of the PSR, that every action an 
animal performs relates to another object (in the form of a motive) that, 
although at times unconsciously, serves as an explanation of it. Although 
Schopenhauer does not discuss the possibility of states of affairs as given 
causes, the main idea behind this lies in the fact that there is a range of 
different forms in which these objects relate to each other and that the 
relation between two given objects can take, in a non-exclusive way, more 
than one form. The chicken’s possession of a beak could be explained by 
the anatomical explanation of the molecular configuration of the beak and 
also by the end or function that the beak has in the life of the bird. 
Nevertheless, in the same way as with efficient causes, it does not require 
much to realise that final causes fall short in the explanation of nature, even 
in a Darwinian account of nature, for that would presuppose teleology. Even 
if we explain an animal’s behaviour qua animal in terms of final causes, the 
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question remains about by what means such behaviour takes place. 
Explanation through final causes cannot give an account of the “original 
force” in nature, by means of which a certain behaviour or action takes 
place. Once again, as with efficient causes, Schopenhauer is left with an 
incomplete explanation of perceptual representation. 
In the next section, I intend to argue that Schopenhauer does in fact 
give us an answer to the incompleteness of explaining the experienced 
nature through efficient and final causes. He provides the philosophical 
counterpart to both of these types of scientific explanation of nature through 
the introduction of the doctrines of Ideas and Intelligible Characters, both of 
which complement his view on the fourth form of the PSR.  
4.2 The Doctrines of Ideas and Character as an Answer to the 
Incompleteness of Causality 
 
As I have been anticipating, and thus not surprising for the reader, I 
believe Schopenhauer gives an answer to the incompleteness of an 
explanation of nature as portrayed in the Fourfold Root through the 
adoption of the doctrines of Ideas and Intelligible Characters. The 
importance of this answer, and therefore of this complement to a scientific 
assessment of the world, lies in what was mentioned in the second chapter 
about the relevance philosophy has in explaining the unity of reality. The 
nature of this explanation, as mentioned in the introduction, is the essence of 
philosophy and is circumscribed by its metaphysical limits and 
independence from the forms of knowledge. Schopenhauer’s entire system 
is erected from the basis that the world, distinguished between 
representation and thing in itself, is in appearance separated in two halves. 
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Therefore, the complement to a scientific world-view comes to adjust the 
explanatory balance by uniting these two aspects of reality. Moreover, it 
presents the philosophical counterpart, and thus gives the last possible 
explanation, of the purportedly limited view that science has to offer. 
 I believe that the key aspect still in need of further explanation to 
understand Schopenhauer’s purpose and the importance of his introduction 
of both doctrines, lies in the relation that the basic distinction between the 
subject of cognition (or subject of knowing) and subject of willing has with 
these doctrines. Borrowing Schopenhauer’s expression of his philosophy 
being like ‘Thebes with a hundred gates’, I believe it true that any aspect of 
his system leads us to its core, i.e. to the unity of the subject of cognition 
and the subject of willing or, as sometimes he also calls it, the miracle par 
excellence (FR p. 136). In his exposition of the fourth form of the PSR, 
Schopenhauer opens the door, for the first time in the Fourfold Root, to 
catch a further glimpse into the world of the in itself. As with PSR of 
becoming, the fourth form of this principle has its own particular object, 
which in this case is of a whole different kind, viz. the subject of willing. 
This, Schopenhauer remarks, “is object to the cognizing subject and indeed 
is given only to the inner sense; thus, it appears only in time, not in space 
[…]” (FR p. 133). The subject of willing is presented by Schopenhauer as 
the object of introspection. The subject of cognition, knowing all of the 
representation that in one way or another is subject to the PSR, is the 
necessary unknowable counterpart of the objects of knowledge. It is, in 
other words, one of the necessary sides of the subject-object relation. 
Therefore, Schopenhauer remarks, the knowing subject qua knowing 
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subject can never be the object of knowledge (see Section 1.1). What we do 
know about ourselves though is not the subject qua subject of knowledge 
but qua subject of willing. In introspection, Schopenhauer notices, “we find 
ourselves always as willing” (FR p. 136). And it is the shared identity 
between the subject of knowing and the subject of willing that makes it “the 
knot of the world and therefore inexplicable” (FR p. 136). It is in this point, 
in ourselves as willing and knowing subjects, where both halves of the 
world meet. For Schopenhauer, in an inexplicable way and without being 
tied to the rules of cognition, i.e. to the rules of the PSR, we encounter in 
ourselves both the world as representation and as Will. Representation 
because we have awareness of our own bodies qua objects of perceptual 
experience and Will because it is the most immediate (due to its 
independence from the form of space) form of knowledge given by inner 
experience.  
The importance of the subject of willing in Schopenhauer lies in that 
while being independent of all the forms of cognition, it gives us insight into 
the inner nature of ourselves and of the world. Schopenhauer’s introduction 
of the subject of willing appears to be an attempt on his part to explain the 
ultimate condition of a metaphysical subject that remains in unity with the 
subject as representation. The subject of willing, then, appears as the object 
of the fourth form of the PSR in so far as it is the source of motivation from 
which individual doings are to be explained. Falling short of providing an 
explanation of actions and doings through motives (or the third form of 
causality), the PSR of motivation leads us to recognise the special role the 
subject of willing has. Even with the knowledge that individual human 
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beings operate through motives, as it has been shown in the previous 
section, it is yet a mystery why certain actions have a specific motivational 
ground. Through the knowledge of the subject of willing, or in other words, 
through our inner experience,  
we know that an event is an act of will, evoked by a motive that consists of 
a mere representation. Thus we recognize the influence of the motive, like 
all other causes, not only from the outside, and hence only mediately, but 
we simultaneously recognise it from the inside, quite immediately, and 
therefore in accordance with an entire way of acting […] Here we stand 
behind the scenes […] and experience the secret of how, in accordance 
with its innermost nature, the cause produces the effect […] motivation is 
causality seen from within. (FR p. 137, emphasis in original) 
The fourth form of the PSR complements the incomplete version of 
nature given by causality in its third form (as motives). In a way, it 
completes the account given by the PSR of becoming in the form of motives 
and adds the remaining piece in Schopenhauer’s scheme of the world as 
being both Will and representation. An explicit remark on this is found 
immediately following Schopenhauer’s exposition of the law of motivation, 
where he says:  
The law of motivation is related to the law of causality […], so this fourth 
class of object for the subject [subject of willing] […] is related to the first 
class [objects of experience]. This insight is the cornerstone of my whole 
metaphysics. (FR p. 138)  
After introducing the object of inner experience, Schopenhauer 
completes the idea of the causality of action. On the one hand, we are able 
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to explain the representational aspect of actions through causality seen as a 
motive. On the other, we come to understand that the way our actions 
unfold in representation in one way as compared to another is the product of 
our shared nature as subjects of willing. Nevertheless, there is still more to 
understand about the influence that the subject of willing has on the subject, 
namely, the more specific influence the will, manifested in the subject of 
willing, has over cognition.  
Schopenhauer describes this influence by saying that it “compels 
cognition […] generally directing attention to this or that and evoking any 
series of thoughts it prefers” (FR p. 138). The will, Schopenhauer continues, 
“is what sets the whole mechanism in action: in line with the person’s 
interests, i.e. their individual ends […]” (FR p. 138). Being that the will sets 
the whole mechanism of action into motion and is the hidden director that 
orchestrates possibilities of action, it is the law of motivation that serves as 
the metaphysical ground for the unfolding of our actions. Looking back to 
the introductory chapter, Schopenhauer establishes the difference between 
human beings and animals in their self-determination through motivation 
derived from concepts. Possessing reason, human beings are able to find a 
source of motivation in abstract concepts whose ultimate origin is the 
abstraction from particular instances of experience. Human beings have the 
peculiar characteristic of being motivated by abstract representations. On 
this, Schopenhauer remarks that the law of motivation determines the 
association between ideas, “for that which rules the sensorium, and 
determines it to follow analogy or another association of ideas in this or that 
direction, is the will of the thinking subject” (WW II p. 136). In other 
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words, the subject qua subject of willing influences cognition and the 
association of ideas that serve as our source of motivation, driving us into an 
action. Knowledge of the subject of willing is what gives Schopenhauer the 
basis to claim that the world ‘in itself’ is nothing else but will. To say that 
the world ‘in itself’ is Will, is the same as saying that we, in our inner 
nature, shared by all nature, are subjects of willing. 
I believe there is enough evidence, from what has been discussed 
thus far, to establish that the importance and meaning of Schopenhauer’s 
adoption of the doctrine of Intelligible Characters goes beyond the need to 
find a locus for freedom: the doctrine’s importance is found in that fact that 
it is the metaphysical counterpart that completes the explanation of the 
causality of action. For the reasons just given, I agree with Matthias 
Kossler’s (2009) words: “The metaphysics of will can […] be regarded as a 
necessary correction of the first unsatisfactory causal model” (p. 84). By 
saying that it is the willing subject that influences cognition and thus 
ultimately drives the subject to a variety of possibilities of action, 
Schopenhauer is still in need, as happened with the explanation through 
efficient causes, of an ultimate element that acts as the metaphysical 
counterpart to motives. Although one might say that Schopenhauer has 
provided a solution to this problem by saying that the Will fills this role, the 
concept of Will is still too vague and broad to do so. Although 
Schopenhauer presents the Will as the ultimate metaphysical standpoint of 
reality, as a notion it is too general for constituting an explanatory principle 
of human action. Moreover, in contrast with the notion of Intelligible 
Character, the notion of Will does not become known to us through a 
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progression that starts with the knowledge of outer experience; it is 
immediate. As Schopenhauer remarks, the “actual identity of the cognizer 
with that which is cognized as willing […] is immediately given” (FR p. 
136, emphasis in original). Therefore, there is no basis to claim what I 
would call an “epistemological identity” between the notion of subject of 
willing and Intelligible Characters. By this, I mean that there is a difference 
between the epistemological means from which we gain access to these 
notions. I will expand on this point in what follows.  
With Will being that which appears as the other half of the world, 
Schopenhauer is in need of a more specific characterisation of the form it 
adopts when determining the unfolding of actions. In other words, he must 
find an objectification of the Will that allows him to complete the apparent 
(for the subject) dual image of the unfolding of activity. I believe this need 
is more clearly understood when considering the following remarks on the 
association of ideas. Schopenhauer says: “any image that is suddenly 
presented in our imagination, and any judgement that does not follow from 
a ground that was previously present must be evoked through an act of will 
that has a motive […]” (FR p. 138, emphasis added) .This act of Will, as 
Schopenhauer defines it, can be identified with the Intelligible Character 
which the empirical character of each individual, i.e. the empirical unfolding 
of her actions, must follow as a model (see Section 3.3). We have seen that 
the reason Schopenhauer must call the object of inner experience as Will, is 
that it appears as an object for us. But in the unfolding of actions, we see 
that the Will appears as a character that preserves continuity and “stamps its 
seal” on every individual action. Therefore, it is only known once such 
  
108 
empirical unfolding has already taken place. Following a similar logic, this 
is why it would be called character, for it displays a constant character in 
every individual action. Schopenhauer introduced Intelligible Characters 
with the consideration that they possess a role similar to one of the Ideas. 
From the parallelism presented above, I believe one can go further in 
describing Atwell’s interpretation of both Characters and Ideas as “third 
explanatory factors”, and present them as the two philosophical counterparts 
and complements for the explanation of causality at two different levels.   
Schopenhauer has made clear the usefulness of both efficient and 
final causes for explaining the relation between objects of perceptual 
experience. He has also expressed the incapacity of efficient causes to give a 
complete account of nature due to the constraints presented by the PSR. In 
this sense, as one possible interpretation, Ideas and Intelligible Characters 
(whether referring to individuals or species) appear as the necessary 
metaphysical explanation, the other side of the coin, for a portrayal of the 
relation between objects of perceptual experience at these two levels. These 
doctrines come to complete the explanation of nature which is presumably 
dual, but that finds unity when its constituting elements appear as the result 
of the forms imposed by the knowing subject. Due to the portrayal of Ideas 
and Intelligible Characters, for which I remit to the previous chapters of this 
thesis, their independence from the PSR allows them to fit the role of 
explanatory devices and derive their own portion of reality, thus being 
“more real” than their empirical counterparts. To illustrate this point and the 
difference between the notions of Idea and Intelligible Character, let us 
imagine the following. A man is lying under a tree and an apple falls on his 
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head. He starts wondering about what caused the apple to fall. After a 
thorough investigation he realises that the ultimate cause of the apple falling 
is gravity, but then another question arises: Why does gravity behave as it 
does? What I believe would be Schopenhauer’s answer to this example is: 
The man, from a particular instance of the action of gravity in his perceptual 
experience, independently of any particular instance of it, concluded that 
there must exist an original force; he reached the Idea of gravity. In other 
words, he would say that gravity qua gravity is just a representation that, 
mysteriously for the subject, has its origin in the Will as a thing in itself. 
The notion of gravity that the man has now, reached through progressive 
knowledge and starting from his enquiry through efficient causes, is an 
immediate object of knowledge that finds itself independent from any causal 
relation with other objects. It is gravity at its “purest state”, its Idea. Ideas, 
as I believe Schopenhauer presents them, are not the final link in the causal 
chain of explanation (for they are outside the PSR) On the contrary, they are 
the ultimate object of knowledge which makes possible such progression of 
the chain in terms of efficient causes. In other words, the Idea is the 
metaphysical counterpart of its representational instances that, in a way that 
will remain unknown for the subject of knowledge, determines how the 
(efficient) causal relations are to take place. In turn, the subject of 
knowledge who in this case is the man that is contemplating this Idea, does 
not care about its relation to any other object in representation including 
himself. He became a pure subject of knowledge.  
If my reading of how Ideas are explanatory of causality in terms of 
efficient causes is correct, then I believe a similar account could be 
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sustained for Intelligible Characters. The main difference between one and 
the other is that the means by which subjects reach their knowledge are 
different, insofar as they depict a different form of causality in perceptual 
experience. What I believe to be a further reason for introducing Intelligible 
Characters (or at times just plainly ‘characters’) in addition to the notion of 
Ideas, is that the starting point from which we get some insight of characters 
is different in that it constitutes a distinct form of the law of causality. 
Intelligible Characters, then, appear as the explanation for an understanding 
of the world through final causes. If we are wondering about either the 
actions of a species or a specific individual, we ought to reach a static 
character, an Intelligible Character, that, as Ideas do, allows for the 
motivational causal chain to take place when a determinate action occurs. 
This character, as Schopenhauer describes it, is only to be the object of 
knowledge as the seal that unifies every individual action in experience. In 
theatre, the artist is able to express, in a fictional way, this notion of a static 
eternal character.15  
At this point, and before continuing, I would like to consider Edward 
Kleist’s (2010) thesis on the role that Intelligible Characters play in the 
unification of human consciousness. Kleist’s remarks on this arise from his 
attempt to solve Janaway’s problem about individuation. Although I agree 
with most of Kleist’s analysis and conclusions regarding the role of the 
doctrine of Intelligible Characters, I believe his analysis errs in some 
respects when he attempts to establish a correlation between this doctrine 
and Ideas. I believe that Kleist, in his efforts to correlate the two doctrines, 
                                                 
15  See Cartwright (1988) for an account of Schopenhauer’s distinction of characters.  
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failed to sufficiently emphasize the role of Ideas in contrast with the role 
assigned to Intelligible Characters. This led him to associate both doctrines 
while failing to discuss the necessity and importance of each doctrine 
individually. 
Briefly, Kleist’s thesis regards Schopenhauer’s adoption of 
Intelligible Character as the notion that gives unity to human 
consciousness.16 In other words, through Intelligible Characters, 
Schopenhauer “indicates will as the one responsible for its coherence” 
(Kleist, 2010, p. 23) in an individualized way thus shaping moods, feelings 
and desires. Intelligible Characters, Kleist (2010) remarks, “could be 
understood as a volitional impulse that unconsciously and passively drives 
the very generation of consciousness itself by weaving together the 
succession of discrete acts of attention” (p. 23). This is so, because 
Intelligible Characters are rooted in the Will through their association with 
Ideas. Nevertheless, there are two points to which I would like to attend. 
The first relates to Kleist’s attention to the correlation between Ideas and 
Intelligible Characters, and the second, to the role of Ideas in a teleological 
explanation. Regarding the first point, Kleist establishes a correlation 
between the two doctrines and says that: 
individual human beings are individuated in one way by their spatio-
temporal positions, thus by means of the principium individuationis, but in 
another way, their individuality is rooted in the articulation of the Ding-an-
sich [Thing in itself] into Ideas. Schopenhauer applies his Platonic-Kantian 
conception of species-Ideas as the articulation of the Ding-an-sich into 
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intelligible characters towards the claim that individual human character 
has its roots […] in the objectification of the will into Ideas. (Kleist, 2010, 
p. 19, emphasis in original) 
Kleist’s source for these assertions is Schopenhauer’s remark that “the 
intelligible character coincides with the Idea, or more properly with the 
original act of will that reveals itself in the Idea” (WW I p. 156).  
I believe there is enough material in Schopenhauer to correlate the 
doctrines of Ideas and Intelligible Characters. Nevertheless, it seems to me 
that there is a distinction to be made. One possible conclusion is to that 
individual human characters are rooted in Intelligible Characters which in 
turn, as is the same with Ideas, are rooted in the thing in itself. Therefore, 
Schopenhauer would make use of the notion of Ideas and the notion of ‘act 
of will’ for establishing that this is so. Another possible conclusion is that 
the individual human character has its roots in the articulation of the thing in 
itself into Ideas. I believe that if the second option is adopted, as Kleist 
would suggest, the whole notion of Intelligible Characters would be 
rendered useless because the only necessary element for establishing the 
root of individuality would be the Idea of each individual. Without thinking 
that Schopenhauer uses the terminology just for the sake of it, there is 
enough evidence throughout his work to read that individuality has its roots 
in the first option.  
The second point I would like to emphasize is directly deduced from 
the first. Since Kleist is suggesting that individuality is rooted in the 
articulation of Ideas, he reaches the inevitable consequence that he is not 
able to recognize Schopenhauer’s remarks on the differences between 
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efficient and final causes for explaining inorganic and organic nature 
respectively. Kleist says that Schopenhauer “thought that means-ends 
relations contribute to our knowledge of appearances in much the same way 
as the ascription of efficient causality conditions our knowledge of 
appearances” (Kleist, 2010, p. 20). Shortly thereafter, he says: 
Schopenhauer’s debt to Platonism with regard to teleology lies in the 
conception of Ideas as being formative principles which give unity to 
organisms and non-living forces […] Schopenhauer attributes to the Ideas 
a teleological role insofar as they determine the relation among means and 
ends which defines organic unity. (Kleist, 2010, p. 21)  
There are two points I would like to clarify. First, I have already 
shown in the second chapter that Schopenhauer gives an explicative role to 
Ideas in that they constitute the metaphysical counterpart of original forces 
through an explanation from efficient causes (see Section 2.3). In the same 
way, I have also already shown that Schopenhauer does, in fact, make the 
distinction between the roles of efficient and final causes in explaining 
inorganic and organic nature (see Section 4.2). Taking this into 
consideration, Kleist’s interpretation of individuality being rooted in the 
articulation of Ideas renders useless, once again, the whole notion of 
Intelligible Characters in the determination of the unity of either organic or 
inorganic nature. If Ideas already establish the unity for both and if efficient 
and final causes are equally explicative of nature as a whole, then there 
would be no need for Schopenhauer to present a further notion of 
Intelligible Characters, as Ideas would be playing a double role in the 
explanation of the unity of nature as a whole. In such a case, Kleist’s 
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interpretation of Intelligible Characters as giving unity to individual 
consciousness is doubtful in the light of the unclear necessity for them to 
play such role. 
In contrast with Kleist’s interpretation, I believe that my reading of 
the doctrine regarding the understanding Intelligible Characters as the 
metaphysical counterpart of an explanation through final causes is more 
comprehensive considering Schopenhauer’s different uses for the 
terminology. First, my interpretation is not limited to regarding the role of 
Intelligible Characters as fundamental to the formation of an individualized 
consciousness, but it also extends to the explanation of the character of 
species (mentioned explicitly by Schopenhauer) and finds coherence with 
Schopenhauer’s use of the term ‘character’ for natural kinds. Additionally, 
my interpretation does not disregard Schopenhauer’s explicit assertions 
about the utility and near exclusivity of efficient and final causes for the 
explanations of inorganic and organic nature respectively. If we regard Ideas 
as fundamental for a teleological explanation of nature, we would render the 
introduction of Intelligible Characters useless due to the sole ability of Ideas 
to fill that place. From there the questioning could go even further to ask 
whether Ideas could be used as the “locus for responsibility” instead of 
Intelligible Characters. By correlating Ideas and Characters in the way he 
does, Kleist leaves the door open for the argument that Characters are an 
extraneous and unnecessary element of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. 
Now it is time to provide a solution to the problems previously 
presented and argue why this reading agrees with an interpretation of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy as an organic unity. First, I have presented that 
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the problem of Ideas as third ontological factors, somewhere between 
representation and the thing in itself, neglects Schopenhauer’s intentions to 
present the distinction between the two as being the result of the forms 
applied by the knowing subject. Therefore, Ideas are not to be read as an 
extra ontological category, for Schopenhauer advocates the unity of the 
world as Will and representation. This difference is only made by the 
knowing subject, who in the knowledge of Ideas becomes a pure subject of 
knowledge when contemplating a particular object of representation. 
Second, as we have come to see, based on explicit remarks by 
Schopenhauer himself, that Magee’s worries about the utility of the doctrine 
of Ideas are unfounded for their importance comes from the necessity of 
giving a philosophical account that completes the scientific image of the 
world. In such a case, regardless of the latest discoveries in biology through 
the analysis of genes, the role Ideas play in explaining nature arises from 
Schopenhauer’s own necessity to portray the unity of the world in its two 
aspects. This is the reason why Ideas are not to be “replaced” by genetic 
discoveries that explain the constancy of species. When contemplated, 
Ideas, although belonging to the realm of representation due to their 
dependence on the pure subject of knowledge, are to be seen in their 
independence from the PSR and therefore from the relation between 
individual objects of experience with one another. Third, once explained 
that the parallelism between Ideas and Characters goes beyond an 
interpretation that regards them as “third explanatory factors” (which is why 
they are necessary for getting a complete picture of the world), it is relevant 
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to state why in both cases the plurality of these two does not represent a 
problem for Schopenhauer.  
The reason why plurality does not pose a problem for either of these 
two doctrines lies in the fact that the assessment is based on a 
misconception. As I have presented, space and time are the necessary 
features that allow for plurality. Nonetheless, in the chapter on Characters, a 
distinction was made between plurality without space and time and plurality 
in the ‘in itself’. As a complement to the view of nature through the PSR, 
Ideas and Characters acquire their plurality from a very different source than 
do objects under the PSR. Returning to the first form of the PSR, objects of 
perceptual experience have change as their essence. States of matter become 
other states through their interactions. This is possible only through the 
concurrence of time and space that allows for their plurality in function of 
the constant change in which matters are found. On the other hand, Ideas 
and Intelligible Characters, as the eternal counterparts of these changing 
objects and as objects that are not to be related to others, hence dependent 
on the subject of pure knowledge, acquire their status as objects only 
through the knowledge of individual empirical objects in their isolation 
from others. I believe, as I have emphasised throughout this thesis, that 
Schopenhauer is at times inconsistent with his use of terminology. Such 
being the case, the Ideas’ independence from the PSR would not make them 
objects at all, for if they are not to be individuated they would hardly 
constitute objects in the same sense that objects of perceptual experience do. 
By using the term ‘objects’ for referring to objects of experience and Ideas, 
it seems he is making use of the loose concept that refers to the necessary 
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counterpart of the subject. If this is the case, then both Ideas and Intelligible 
Characters acquire their plurality solely from the necessary standpoint of 
being objects for a pure subject of knowledge. Ideas and Characters alike are 
plural as long as there are subjects that contemplate them. As an analogy 
(and only as such), one could take the example of concepts, whose plurality 
seems to depend on a very different source than objects of experience. 
Although for Schopenhauer Ideas are not concepts and not a ‘construction’ 
from a subject, they are also dependent on a knowing subject. In 
Schopenhauer’s words,  
if accordingly we attempt to imagine an objective world without a subject, 
then we become aware that what we are imagining at that moment is in 
truth the opposite of what we intended, namely nothing but just the process 
of the intellect of a knowing being who perceives an objective world […] 
(WW II p. 5, emphasis in original) 
Any attempt to contemplate a world without subjects will inevitably lead to 
an imagined example of the world from the perspective of a subject. Ideas 
and Characters, as objects for the subject, belong to the world as 










My intention in this thesis has been to defend three major claims 
presenting an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s use of the doctrines of Ideas 
and Intelligible Characters. I started by showing one of the problems that 
arises from Schopenhauer’s adoption of the doctrine of Ideas.  This critique, 
I argued, was based on two main premises: The first is that Schopenhauer 
makes a blunt ontological distinction between the world of the ‘in itself’ and 
the world of representation. Second, the world of representation is identified 
with what I have called the world of perceptual experience. In order to show 
that this reading misinterprets Schopenhauer’s original intentions, I 
presented a brief summary of the Platonic and Kantian elements that are 
necessary to consider in Schopenhauer’s philosophy that led him to adopt 
(and accordingly adapt to his thought) Ideas in his distinctive manner. 
Then I presented Schopenhauer’s view on philosophy and its role of 
giving a metaphysical account of the world that “completes” the scientific 
explanation of nature. There, Ideas were presented as playing not only the 
role as objects of aesthetic experience but as the necessary philosophical 
counterpart of aetiological explanation. He does not make an ontological 
distinction between the world as Will and representation: the distinction is 
rather epistemological. My first claim consisted in that we are to understand 
Ideas not as an extra piece of ontology but as a device, located in his 
representational framework, that aids to give a complete account of nature 
in its entirety.  
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In Chapter Three, I presented the content of the problem of 
individuation regarding Intelligible Characters and how it is derived from 
the previous considerations on Ideas. Overall, the problem assumes that 
Schopenhauer would include Intelligible Characters as another piece of 
ontology. Allegedly, their individuation does not cohere with 
Schopenhauer’s own acknowledged restrictions for its possibility. I 
proceeded to address this problem first by establishing the parameters 
within which the answer had to be given. Then, I presented an explicit 
parallelism found in Schopenhauer’s works between the doctrines of Ideas 
and Intelligible Characters. This allowed me to establish what possible role 
Intelligible Characters were to play in Schopenhauer’s system. At the same 
time, with the help of such exposition, I outlined the answer to the problem 
of their individuation. Intelligible Characters, as objects of knowledge, must 
be included as an integral part of Schopenhauer’s representational 
framework. This led to the second major claim, viz. that Intelligible 
Characters are necessary for Schopenhauer’s account of the world in its 
unity, in a similar way as with the doctrine of Ideas as shown from the 
exposed parallel between the two.  
The purpose of Chapter Four is to show that the doctrines of Ideas 
and Intelligible Characters could be interpreted as Schopenhauer’s 
explanatory devices meant to complete the epistemological framework in 
his view of a unitary understanding of the world. Ideas fit this interpretation 
by completing the scientific image of the world through efficient causes, 
while Intelligible Characters, due to their connection with the law of 
motivation, could be understood as explanatory devices meant to complete 
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explanations through final causes. The third and final claim, thus, presents 
Ideas and Intelligible Characters as necessary philosophical components in 
Schopenhauer’s system, meant to give a complete account of the world left 
untouched by causality in its efficient and final forms.  
In spite of the fact that at times Schopenhauer does not make 
consistent use of some terminology, I believe there is enough evidence 
throughout his works, to sustain an interpretation of Ideas and Intelligible 
Characters as explanatory devices, highlighting their epistemological role 
rather than an ontological one. In this interpretation, questions about their 
ontological status and plurality are answered through a different approach. 
Both Ideas and Intelligible Characters depend on the knowing subject and 
do not constitute “another piece of the puzzle”, but rather another level of 
his representational framework. In spite of the fact that this particular 
reading is meant to solve some issues of inconsistency in Schopenhauer’s 
work, there is still room for other interpretations. I do not believe that a 
system as rich and complex as Schopenhauer’s is restricted to one-sided 
readings. I am aware that a complete consistency will hardly be achieved, 
though I believe that consistency in some aspects of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy ought not to be disregarded. Schopenhauer’s exposition will 
always leave possibilities for different interpretations. Even though this 
thesis intends to calm some worries, I am aware that this is no achieved 
without compromising some consistency in some other aspects of his 
writings. As presented, Schopenhauer’s hardly consistent use of 
nomenclature and his reiterated remarks on what seems to be, for example, 
the ontological status of Ideas leave us craving for clarity. Overall, I believe 
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that attempts to find coherence in his system as a whole will have the 
unpleasant consequence of leaving some uncertain details of 
Schopenhauer’s exposition unexplained. Whether or not Schopenhauer 
could have been more prolific in the presentation of his philosophy is 
something I will not refer to. Nevertheless, it is clear from the different 
pieces of literature on the topic that it is not an easy task to produce a 
committed and thorough analysis of his system without leaving some 
difficult issues unattended and unexplained.  
Although many important issues were not developed in this thesis, I 
hope that this interpretation of the unity and functionality of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy serves as a ground that helps readers to understand, under a 
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